Statement of Reasons—Expiry review determination: Oil Country Tubular Goods 2 (OCTG2 2025 ER)

Administrative record

[37] The information considered by the CBSA for purposes of this expiry review investigation is contained in the administrative record. The administrative record includes the information on the CBSA’s exhibit listing, which is comprised of the CBSA exhibits and information submitted by interested parties, including information which the interested parties feel is relevant to the decision as to whether dumping is likely to continue or resume absent the CITT order. This information may consist of expert analysts’ reports, excerpts from trade publications and news articles, orders and findings issued by authorities of Canada or of a country other than Canada, documents from international trade organizations such as the World Trade Organization (WTO) and responses to the ERQs submitted by Canadian producers, importers, exporters and foreign producers.

[38] For purposes of an expiry review investigation, the CBSA sets a date after which no new information submitted by interested parties will be placed on the administrative record or considered as part of the CBSA’s expiry review investigation. This is referred to as the “closing of the record date” and is set to allow participants time to prepare their case briefs and reply submissions based on the information that is on the administrative record as of the closing of the record date. For this expiry review investigation, the administrative record closed on January 21, 2026.

Procedural issues

[39] The CBSA will normally not consider any new information submitted by participants subsequent to the closing of the record date. However, in certain exceptional circumstances, it may be necessary to permit new information to be submitted. The CBSA will consider the following factors in deciding whether to accept new information submitted after the closing of the record date:

1. the nature, relevance, materiality and volume of the information
2. the difficulties encountered by the participant in obtaining or submitting the information by the date specified (for example, the availability of the information or emergence of new or unforeseen issues)
3. whether the information can reasonably be taken into consideration by the CBSA for purposes of the proceedings including whether there is sufficient time to verify the information
4. whether other parties are likely to be prejudiced if the information is used (for example, the opportunity for other participants to respond to the information)
5. whether acceptance of the information would compromise the ability of the CBSA to conduct the proceedings expeditiously and
6. any other factors that are relevant in the circumstances

[40] Participants wishing to file new information after the closing of the record date, either separately or in case briefs or reply submissions, must identify this information so that the CBSA can decide whether it will be included in the record for purposes of the determination.

[41] On January 26, 2026, the CBSA received a request from counsel on behalf of Niko Pipe seeking approval to file revised appendices onto the administrative record despite the record being closed on January 21, 2026.

[42] After reviewing the relevant criteria and policy regarding late filed submissions, the CBSA determined that the materials provided did not meet the necessary thresholds for late filed submissions, and as such the submitted revised appendices were rejected and do not form part of the administrative record. The reasoning and decision were placed on the record in accordance with the CBSA procedures.^{Footnote 25}

Parties contending that continued or resumed dumping is likely

Domestic producers: Interpro, Tenaris Canada and Welded Tube (collectively, the Canadian Producers)^{Footnote 26}

[44] In their ERQ responses and case briefs, the Canadian producers made representations supporting their position that the dumping of certain OCTG from Chinese Taipei, India, Indonesia, South Korea, Thailand, Türkiye, Ukraine and Vietnam is likely to continue or resume should the order be allowed to expire.

[45] Prior to undertaking a country-by-country analysis, a non-exhaustive list of common factors identified by the Canadian producers are summarized as follows:

• International market conditions
• Trade restrictive measures
• Continued dumping over the POR and
• Attractiveness of the Canadian market

International market conditions^{Footnote 27}

[46] The global OCTG market is expected to experience continued uncertainty through 2027 due to projected declines in oil prices, increased OPEC+ production, and weakening demand. This situation is further influenced by the implementation of the EU Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanism (CBAM), the United States tariff measures, and the role of China in the global steel industry, all of which contribute to excess capacity in the steel sector. As access to foreign markets becomes more limited or less profitable, OCTG exporters are increasingly directing supply toward Canada as a stable alternative destination.

[47] The Canadian producers argue that Canada should continue to maintain a defensive posture to protect domestic producers from an influx of low-priced foreign OCTG. Through a robust Tariff Rate Quota (TRQ) system and active anti-dumping measures, the CBSA should aim to mitigate the risk of trade diversion. These measures are critical as the domestic industry attempts to balance global market volatility with the need for operational discipline in an era of moderated oil prices and cautious drilling activity.

Trade restrictive measures^{Footnote 28}

[48] The Canadian producers argue that the proliferation of trade restrictive measures in major OCTG consuming countries has limited the availability of alternative export markets for the subject countries.

[49] A number of major trading partners have implemented trade-restrictive measures affecting global OCTG flows. These actions, ranging from tariffs and safeguard measures to quota reductions and carbon-related border adjustments, have limited market access for OCTG exporters and altered traditional trade patterns. This is evidenced by measures adopted in the United States, Mexico, the European Union, and the United Kingdom.

[50] In the United States, with the introduction of trade actions, including the Section 232 tariff increase to 50 percent and the application of anti-dumping and countervailing duties on OCTG imports from subject countries, have made the United States’ OCTG market increasingly restrictive, with additional concerns arising from findings of circumvention through Thailand. These measures, taken together, are expected to divert significant volumes of OCTG into other export markets.

[51] Mexico has imposed new tariffs of up to 35 percent on various products, including OCTG. These new tariffs apply to all non-free trade partners with Mexico, which includes the subject countries.

[52] The European Union has extended its steel safeguard measure to June 2026, maintaining a 25 percent out-of-quota duty on steel imports, including OCTG, and has further reduced tariff-rate quotas (“TRQ”) for welded OCTG as of April 2025. Although developing countries are generally exempt unless their imports exceed 3 percent of total volumes, all subject countries are nonetheless captured under at least one TRQ category, with several facing country-specific quotas.

[53] The United Kingdom maintains a steel safeguard measure that applies a 25 percent tariff on out-of-quota imports, covering welded OCTG from Korea, Chinese Taipei, India, and Türkiye, but not seamless OCTG. Although several developing countries are currently exempt (Indonesia, Thailand, Ukraine and Vietnam), the risk of exceeding the 3-percent import threshold and becoming subject to the tariff-rate quota continues to act as a deterrent and trade barrier.

[54] The Canadian producers highlight that a significant market, the United States has anti-dumping measures on OCTG from five of the subject countries, notably, India, South Korea, Türkiye, Vietnam and Ukraine. Additionally, with its Section 232 Measures, the United States has imposed tariffs of 50% on imported steel products, including OCTG, which are in place currently for all the subject countries. Lastly, the Canadian producers submit that other trade measures like safeguards and tariff-rate quotas, which include OCTG, have been imposed on the subject countries by the European Union, which limit the opportunities in other export markets.

[55] The Canadian producers submit that these trade measures (i.e., safeguards, quotas, and tariffs) and anti-dumping measures against the subject countries are likely to result in significant volumes of OCTG being diverted to Canada.

Continued dumping over the POR^{Footnote 29}

[56] The Canadian producers submit that the subject goods were dumped extensively during the POR, to the extent that necessitated two re-investigations with one re-investigation resulting in retroactive duty assessments. A total of nearly CAD $4 million in SIMA duties were assessed during the POR in which the highest amount of SIMA duties was witnessed in the last two periods of the POR.

[57] Additionally, the Canadian producers argue that the low import volumes from certain countries during the POR evidence the subject countries’ inability to compete at non-dumped price.

Attractiveness of the Canadian market^{Footnote 30}

[58] Canada is a major energy producer and represents an important market for suppliers, given the significant volumes of OCTG consumed.

[59] The Canadian producers submit that the relative stable Canadian market conditions will continue to be attractive to OCTG producers and exporters in the subject countries. The numerous drilling and pipeline expansion projects to be completed in the near future all correspond to steady and increased OCTG demand in the Canadian market. Furthermore, relatively higher prices are historically witnessed for OCTG in Canada as compared to other international markets.

[60] Although having higher prices, the Canadian producers underline the market for OCTG in Canada is nevertheless one that is price sensitive. In support of its claim, it cites the CITT who has repeatedly confirmed the price sensitivity around OCTG which can quickly result in downward pricing spirals.

[61] As prices for OCTG are similar in the United States and Canada, without the CITT order in place, the Canadian producers argue the trade barriers implemented by the United States have and will continue to cause a diversion of steel products to Canada. In this regard, the Canadian producers underline that OCTG from all subject countries in the United Staes are subject to a 50% tariff pursuant to section 232 measures.

Factors specific to the subject countries

Chinese Taipei^{Footnote 31}

[62] The Canadian producers note that there is effectively no oil and gas drilling activity in Chinese Taipei and that domestic demand for OCTG is negligible, a point supported by producers Shin Yang and Tension Steel. In their ERQ responses, both indicated that they rarely sell OCTG in the domestic market because there is generally no such demand in Chinese Taipei.

[63] In this context, the Canadian producers submit that OCTG producers in Chinese Taipei are entirely dependant on exports with a strong export inclination towards the North American markets. The Canadian producers highlight that the exports of OCTG of Shin Yang and Tension Steel were destined mainly to the United States and Canada. Furthermore, in terms of export volume, the Canadian producers note that Chinese Taipei was considered the leader in OCTG to the United States in August 2025, supplying approximately 30,000 metric tonnes.^{Footnote 32}

[64] As to the production capacity, the Canadian producers provide a list of the individual capacity of OCTG producers and note that the data understates the total capacity given that there are other producers in Chinese Taipei with licensed capabilities to produce to the API-5CT specification.

[65] At the macro level, the Canadian producers cite information that the steel sector in Chinese Taipei has and continues to experience excess capacity which threatens profit margins for steelmakers. The Canadian producers contend that there also remains significant excess capacity in Chinese Taipei for OCTG. In support of their claim, the Canadian producers note the excess capacity of Shin Yang and Tension Steel and indicate that given that such data is not available for other welded and seamless pipe producers, the true excess capacity for OCTG in Chinese Taipei is much greater.

[66] The Canadian producers also cite the global trade measures enforced against OCTG and pipe and tube products from Chinese Taipei which demonstrate Chinese Taipei’s propensity to dump.

India^{Footnote 33}

[67] While there has been no significant change in the demand for OCTG in India, the Canadian producers note that the OCTG producers in India have sufficient production capacity to address the domestic demand.

[68] In this context, the Canadian producers highlight that even when excluding the data from MSL, the production capacity of the other OCTG producers in India is more than adequate in supplying the OCTG demand in India. The Canadian producers also underline that the total production capacity is understated and provide a list of other producers in India with licensed capabilities to produce to the API-5CT specification.

[69] At the macro level, the Canadian producers cite information that the steel sector in India has excess capacity and the forecast is that the production capacity increases will outpace its domestic demand, thereby further exacerbating India’s steel overcapacity. The Canadian producers contend that there also remains significant excess capacity for OCTG in India.

[70] To emphasize the export orientation of OCTG producers in India, the Canadian producers cite quotes from various producers in terms of their export-orientation: “an export trading company engaged in export of OCTG and non-OCTG”, “exports to over 50 countries around the world”, and “International Company”, etc. Additionally, the Canadian producers contend that as a result of excess capacity, the available volume destined for exports is high.

[71] In terms of trends and forecasts in India, the Canadian producers submit that the outlook for the demand of OCTG remains stable and cite that there has not been an exploration push for oil and gas.

[72] The Canadian producers also cite the global trade measures enforced against OCTG and pipe and tube products from India which demonstrate India’s propensity to dump. Additionally, the Canadian producers note that the United States concluded its sunset review on OCTG in January 2026, and an anti-dumping rate for India was determined at up to 11.24%.

Indonesia^{Footnote 34}

[73] The Canadian producers submit that demand for OCTG in Indonesia is weak and is expected to be limited as a result of the decline in oil production, aging producing fields and reduction and delays in the exploration activities for oil and gas.

[74] In support of their claim, the Canadian producers cite information that the oil production in Indonesia has been on a downward trend since 2008, declining from 800,000 to 900,000 barrels per day in 2008 to 600,000 barrels per day in 2024. To emphasize further the production decline, the Canadian producers underline the aging fields with only a third of the 45,000 oil and gas wells being active.

[75] The Canadian producers highlight that as part of a policy shift aimed at prioritizing the optimization of existing wells, in late 2024, the government of Indonesia announced a significant reduction of oil and gas exploration permits, reducing licenses from 320 to 140.

[76] With the continued presence of imports of OCTG from China, the Canadian producers describe the market for OCTG in Indonesia as being crowded. In this regard, the Canadian producers note that in 2024, imports from China of seamless OCTG accounted for approximately 58% of total seamless OCTG imports into Indonesia while imports from China of welded OCTG represented more than 35% of total welded OCTG imports into Indonesia.

[77] In terms of trends and forecasts in Indonesia, the current trajectory of Indonesia’s oil and gas industry point to limited domestic demand for OCTG.

[78] As to the production capacity, the Canadian producers provide a list of the individual capacity of OCTG producers and note that the data understates the total capacity given that there are other producers in Indonesia with licensed capabilities to produce to the API-5CT specification.

[79] Without substantial OCTG domestic demand in Indonesia coupled with a demand that is being displaced by OCTG imports from China, to offset lost domestic sales, producers in Indonesia are compelled to seek export markets to absorb excess production.

[80] To emphasize further the export orientation of the OCTG producers in Indonesia, the Canadian producers cite quotes from various producers in terms of their export-orientation: “export-world class products”, “worldwide market” and “trusted by both domestic and international customers”.

South Korea^{Footnote 35}

[81] The Canadian producers submit that there is no meaningful oil and gas exploration and production activities in Korea and consequently, the presence of low to no domestic demand for OCTG.

[82] In support of their claim, the Canadian producers cite information pertaining to the closure in 2022 of the natural gas field in the East Sea and to the production in Korea of 43 million barrels of oil and natural gas in 2024. For illustrative purposes, in 2024, Canada produced 11,813 million barrels of oil and natural gas.

[83] In terms of trends and forecasts in Korea, the Canadian producers submit that the outlook for the demand of OCTG remains pessimistic and cite that the exploration project for oil and gas called Blue Whale was halted in 2025.

[84] As to the production capacity, the Canadian producers provide a list of the individual capacity of OCTG producers and note that the data understates the total capacity given that there is another producer in Korea with licensed capabilities to produce to the API-5CT specification. The Canadian producers further emphasized that without meaningful demand for OCTG in Korea, the Korean OCTG industry is export oriented.

[85] To stress the export orientation of the producers of OCTG in Korea, the Canadian producers cite information which indicates that Korea was the second largest global exporter of OCTG in the years 2024 and in 2025.

[86] The Canadian producers indicate that Korea is subject to numerous trade measures for OCTG and related tubular products in other jurisdictions, including Canada, which demonstrate Korea’s propensity to dump. Additionally, the Canadian producers note that the United States concluded its sunset review on OCTG in January 2026, and an anti-dumping rate for Korea was determined at up to 6.49%.

Thailand^{Footnote 36}

[87] The Canadian producers underline that there had been a slowdown in Thailand’s economy in recent years, which lags behind the average growth rate of Asia’s emerging and developing countries. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) forecasted that such trend in Thailand would continue in 2026 and 2027 with an annual growth rate of 1.6% and 2.2%, respectively.

[88] While Thailand has some oil and gas exploration and production activity, the Canadian producers contend that the OCTG producers in Thailand cannot rely on either the current or future state of the oil and gas industry to maintain throughput and must seek larger export markets. For illustrative purposes, the Canadian producers note that in 2025, Thailand had 5 active oil rigs and 13 active natural gas rigs while Canada had 117 active oil rigs and 58 active gas rigs.

[89] In the context of the relatively slow growth in Thailand, the Canadian producers suggests that significant increases in demand for OCTG driven by general economic demand will not materialize in the near term. The Canadian producers provide evidence to support the declining state of the oil and gas industry in Thailand.

[90] As to the production capacity, the Canadian producers provide a list of the individual capacity of OCTG producers and note that the data understates the total capacity given that there are other producers in Thailand with licensed capabilities to produce to the API-5CT specification. Additionally, the Canadian producers emphasize that OCTG producers in Thailand have the capacity to overwhelm the Canadian market.

[91] To emphasize the export orientation of the producers of OCTG in Thailand, the Canadian producers indicate that Boly Pipe Co. Ltd. and Thai Oil Pipe Co., Ltd. have also shipped to the United States and participated in the CBSA’s 2024 re-investigation on OCTG, and cite a quote of another OCTG producer: “provide high-quality products and services for the steel pipe industry customers globally.”

[92] The Canadian producers also note the current the anti-dumping orders in the United States and in Canada on other tubular products which demonstrate Thailand’s propensity to dump.

Türkiye^{Footnote 37}

[93] Türkiye 's economy continues to face significant challenges, primarily driven by high inflation and interest rates and the depreciation of the Lira. As per the IMF forecasts, between 2025 and 2027, Türkiye’s GDP growth is to remain stable between 4.1% and 4.2%.

[94] The Canadian producers indicate that with a very small OCTG demand in Türkiye and a vast OCTG production capacity, the producers of OCTG are positioned to serve export markets.

[95] As to the production capacity, the Canadian producers highlight that even when excluding the data from Borusan, the production capacity of the other OCTG producers in Türkiye is quite impressive when compared to the production levels of the Canadian producers. The Canadian producers also underline that the total production capacity is understated and provide a list of other producers in Türkiye with licensed capabilities to produce to the API-5CT.

[96] Although there has been an increase in oil production from 2022 to 2024, the Canadian producers state that Türkiye is a relatively marginal player in the global oil and gas sector. For illustrative purposes, the Canadian producers note that in 2024, Türkiye’s oil and gas production as a percentage of Canada’s production, was 1.76%. Furthermore, the Canadian producers underline that Türkiye still remains heavily import-dependent for oil and gas with recent data indicating that this dependency is intensifying rather than diminishing.

[97] The Canadian producers argue that the present adverse market conditions will see companies defer drilling exploration which will severely constrain Türkiye’s ability to absorb the OCTG excess capacity in the domestic market. Additionally, the depreciating Lira will encourage more OCTG exports.

[98] The Canadian producers indicate that Türkiye is subject to numerous trade measures for OCTG and related tubular products in other jurisdictions, including Canada, which demonstrate Türkiye’s propensity to dump. Additionally, the Canadian producers note that the United States concluded its sunset review on OCTG in January 2026, and an anti-dumping rate for Türkiye was determined at up to 35.86%.

Ukraine^{Footnote 38}

[99] The Canadian producers contended that Ukraine OCTG and tubular producers have continued to dump into Canada during the POR. They further noted that Ukrainian producers are subject to multiple trade measures on OCTG and related tubular goods in several jurisdictions, including Canada, which they contend demonstrates an ongoing pattern of dumping in export markets. The Canadian producers also highlighted that, in January 2026, the United States concluded its sunset review on OCTG and assigned Ukraine an anti-dumping rate of up to 7.47%.

[100] The Canadian producers argue that Niko Tube failed to provide its true production capacity, and maintains there is excess OCTG capacity. They point to Niko Tube’s 2024 operational and financial results, which show production of 139,000 MT of OCTG and 349,000 MT of line pipe. According to the Canadian producers, this indicates a rolling capacity of at least 488,000 MT of energy tubular products, representing significant capacity.

[101] The Canadian producers submit that the Ukraine’s OCTG industry is highly export oriented. To support this claim, they highlight that, with the exception of 2023, Niko Tube’s OCTG export sales exceeded its domestic sales in every other period of the POR.

Vietnam^{Footnote 39}

[102] The Canadian producers submit that Vietnam remains a very small and mature market for OCTG, with limited prospects for future growth. The reduced and declining demand for OCTG is directly related to the challenges facing the oil and gas industry in Vietnam.

[103] In terms of trends and forecasts in Vietnam, the Canadian producers note that the average monthly crude oil production has continuously fallen from 182,000 barrels per day in 2022 to 165,000 barrels in the first nine months of 2025, and is expected to be at 160,000 barrels per day in 2028. With respect to natural gas, the Canadian producers also cite information regarding the delays facing the Blue Whale project which postpone the immediate need for OCTG, as the drilling of production wells awaits final investment decisions and government clearance.

[104] As to the production capacity, the Canadian producers provide a list of the individual capacity of the producers of OCTG, which is incomplete and understated, and emphasize that SeAH Steel Vina, the largest OCTG producer in Vietnam, exports over 50% of its production to foreign markets. As a result, the Canadian producers contend that this alone should be sufficient to conclude that producers of OCTG in Vietnam are export oriented.

[105] The Canadian producers also cite the numerous anti-dumping and trade restrictive measures in other jurisdictions currently in place on OCTG and other tubular products, which demonstrate Vietnam’s propensity to dump.

[106] The Canadian producers conclude that the weak demand conditions in Vietnam mean that producers of OCTG will not be able to rely on their home market to relieve excess capacity and demonstrate that the producers in Vietnam will likely have to resume shipping dumped exports to any available market, including Canada should the order expire.

Parties contending that continued or resumed dumping is unlikely

Exporters and foreign producers and government: Shin Yang, Tension Steel, Niko Tube and Ministry of the Economy, Environment and Agriculture of Ukraine

Chinese Taipei^{Footnote 40}

[107] In their ERQ responses, case briefs and reply submissions, Shin Yang and Tension Steel made representations supporting their position that the dumping of certain OCTG from Chinese Taipei^{Footnote 41} is not likely to continue or resume should the order be allowed to expire. The main comments, factors and arguments are summarized below.

[108] The world economy and global oil and gas industries are expected to grow moderately in the near term along with the expansion of the global GDP. Shin Yang and Tension Steel cite a forecast reported by the IMF in January 2026, where the global economic growth is projected to grow at 3.3% in 2026 and 3.2% in 2027. As for OCTG, they reference market intelligence reports which estimate that through 2030, the global demand will continue to grow with a compound annual growth rate of approximately 6% and Canada, with an annual growth rate of 6.3%.

[109] Chinese Taipei’s economy and steel sector are also expected to continue to grow, with a GDP forecast of 3.8% in 2026 and a forecast in the construction market of 4.2% in 2026-2028.

[110] In the case of OCTG, while there is no meaningful domestic demand for these products, the broader demand for steel pipes supports OCTG manufacturers such as Shin Yang and Tension Steel, both of which maintain diversified product lines that include non-OCTG steel pipes.

[111] Although an export orientation for OCTG, Shin Yang and Tension Steel submit that they are not dependent on exports to Canada and point out that during the POR, almost all of their production of OCTG was exported to the United States, which will likely continue to be their main market for OCTG in the near future. Furthermore, Shin Yang submits that its exports of OCTG to Canada were highly profitable because those sales filled in the gap in the market.

[112] In respect to the allegations made by the Canadian producers that exporters from Chinese Taipei cannot compete in the Canadian market at undumped prices, Shin Yang and Tension Steel argue that while producers are looking for opportunities to grow exports to Canada, it does not mean that they would exchange profits for growth in exports to Canada by selling at dumped prices.

[113] Contrary to the assertion made by the Canadian producers, Shin Yang and Tension Steel argue that their reported annual production capacity for OCTG accurately reflects the maximum production capacity; as a result, they do not have excessive production capacity for OCTG.

[114] In regards to the argument made by the Canadian producers that exporters of OCTG from Chinese Taipei have a propensity to dump in export markets, Shin Yang and Tension Steel indicated that they are not subject to any trade remedy measures imposed by any other countries on OCTG except for its exports to Canada. As for non-OCTG products, although there are some trade remedy measures imposed by other jurisdictions, Shin Yang and Tension Steel indicate that such measures are limited, as the producers in Chinese Taipei have focused heavily on the local market and do not engage in exporting much non-OCTG products.

Ukraine^{Footnote 42}

[115] The Ministry of the Economy, Environment and Agriculture of Ukraine (“Ministry”) submits that the expiry of the current order is not likely to result in the resumption of dumping of OCTG from Ukraine, noting that market conditions have changed significantly since the original finding and prior review.

[116] The Ministry explains that its steel and OCTG industries have been severely affected by Russia’s full-scale invasion, which has damaged production facilities, disrupted logistics and energy supply, and created long-term economic constraints, while domestic OCTG demand has remained a priority and continues to grow. Procurement data show that the Ukrainian OCTG market remains functioning and stable, with Niko Tube maintaining its position as the dominant supplier to state-owned oil and gas companies. The Ministry also noted that, aside from measures in Canada, the United States, and the Eurasian Economic Commission, there are no recent anti-dumping or countervailing duty actions against Ukrainian OCTG. On this basis, the Ministry requests that the CBSA revoke the anti-dumping measures.

[117] In its ERQ response, case brief and reply submission, Niko Tube made representations supporting its position that the dumping of certain OCTG from Ukraine is not likely to continue or resume should the order be allowed to expire. The main comments, factors and arguments are summarized below.

[118] Niko Tube rejects the conclusion made by the Canadian producers that the collection of anti-dumping duties as indicative that exporters cannot sell subject goods into Canada at non-dumped prices. Niko Tube submits that given that it has no normal values, all of its subject goods will incur anti-dumping duties at a rate of 37.4% (absent of the Ukraine Goods Remission Order) which this does not mean that every sale to Canada is “dumped”.

[119] Niko Tube maintains that it does not have excess capacity and argues that the OCTG domestic market is marked by stable demand that is anticipated to grow which does not support a strong export inclination.

[120] Niko Tube reiterates that the specific margin of dumping for OCTG issued by the United States for Ukraine is 1.39% and not 7.47%.

Chinese Taipei

[134] The CBSA received ERQ responses, case briefs and reply submissions from Shin Yang and Tension Steel, producers and exporters located in Chinese Taipei. The CBSA relied on the information submitted by these producers/exporters, the Canadian producers as well as other information on the administrative record, in considering whether the dumping of certain OCTG from Chinese Taipei is likely to resume or continue if the order was to expire.

Chinese Taipei’s production capacity and export dependency

[135] Evidence on the record indicates that Chinese Taipei has substantial production capacity for OCTG. There are at least three producers of certain OCTG in Chinese Taipei, namely Chung Hung Steel Corporation (Chung Hung), Shin Yang and Tension Steel.

[136] Responses provided to the ERQ by Shin Yang and Tension Steel show that they collectively maintain a notable production capacity.^{Footnote 51} Evidence on the record indicates that Chung Hung has multiple production facilities with a joint annual production capacity of steel pipe & tube of 248,000 MT.^{Footnote 52} In addition, Chinese Taipei has three other welded and seamless pipe producers that are licensed by the American Petroleum Institute (API) to manufacture API-5CT specification.^{Footnote 53}

[137] In the context of negligible OCTG demand in Chinese Taipei, OCTG producers are entirely dependant on export markets. With fixed production costs, OCTG producers have a strong incentive to maintain a high level of production and capacity utilization which can only be achieved through sales in export markets. Both Shin Yang^{Footnote 54} and Tension Steel^{Footnote 55} indicate that their OCTG exports are mainly destined to the United States and Canada.

Continued dumping over the period of review

[138] CBSA enforcement data indicates that subject goods from Chinese Taipei were dumped during the POR. In 2024, SIMA duties were collected on Chinese Taipei OCTG imports into Canada.

[139] CBSA enforcement data indicates between 2023 and 2024 there was a significant increase in imports from Chinese Taipei. This sharp increase in low-priced imports has likely disrupted the Canadian domestic market, as Chinese Taipei exporters may be relying on dumping practices to expand their market share. This pattern confirms that Chinese Taipei exporters are unable to compete in the Canadian market at non-dumped prices and will likely revert to dumping if the order is rescinded.

Imposition of trade measures by Canada and other jurisdictions on Chinese Taipei

[140] Information on the record indicates that there have been at least nine other measures in other jurisdictions including the European Union, Saudi Arabia, Thailand, Türkiye and the United States, on an assortment of steel pipe and tube products.^{Footnote 56}

[141] In addition to these measures, at the time of this expiry review, the CBSA has anti-dumping measures in force for the following steel products originating in or exported from Chinese Taipei.^{Footnote 57}

• Corrosion-resistant steel sheet
• Carbon steel welded pipe
• Concrete reinforcing bar
• Fasteners
• Heavy plate and
• Steel wire

[142] The CBSA finds that the imposition of the numerous anti-dumping measures on various steel products demonstrates that producers in Chinese Taipei have a propensity to dump. Should the CITT’s finding expire, OCTG producers in Chinese Taipei would be attracted to the Canadian market which may increase the likelihood of continued or resumed dumping of subject goods into Canada.

Determination regarding likelihood of continued or resumed dumping

[143] Based on evidence on the record in respect of: commodity nature of OCTG; capital-intensive nature of steel production; tariffs and safeguard measures on steel imports and diversion of OCTG into Canada; Chinese Taipei’s production capacity and export dependency; continued dumping over the period of review; and imposition of trade measures by Canada and other jurisdictions on Chinese Taipei, the CBSA determined that the expiry of the order is likely to result in the continuation or resumption of dumping of certain OCTG from Chinese Taipei.

India

[144] The CBSA received a joint ERQ response from MSL and GVN, respectively, a producer and an exporter located in India. The CBSA relied on the information submitted by this producer/exporter, the Canadian producers as well as other information on the administrative record, in considering whether the dumping of certain OCTG from India is likely to resume or continue if the order was to expire.

India’s production and excess capacity

[145] Information on the record indicates that India has extremely large production capacity for OCTG. There are at least four producers of OCTG in India, namely Indian Seamless Metal Tubes Limited (ISMT), Jindal Saw Limited, Oil Country Tubular Ltd. and MSL. In addition, India has several other welded and seamless pipe producers, e.g., Ratnamani Metals & Tubes Ltd. and Surya Roshni Ltd., that are licensed by the API to manufacture API-5CT specification.^{Footnote 58} Evidence on the record suggests that India’s total OCTG production capacity to be in excess of 2 million MT.^{Footnote 59}

[146] Evidence on the record shows that MSL’s excess capacity during the first nine months of 2025 exceeds the size of the Canadian OCTG market.^{Footnote 60} With numerous OCTG producers operating in India, the overall excess capacity in India is correspondingly larger. The CBSA notes that even a limited volume of this excess capacity, if directed to Canada, would exceed the sales volumes of Canadian producers in the domestic market.

OCTG producers’ dependency on exports

[147] The information on the record indicates that domestic OCTG demand in India is expected to remain stable, as there is no material increase in oil and gas exploration activity forecasted and India’s crude oil production has remained relatively unchanged.^{Footnote 61}

[148] Given the size of the domestic OCTG market and the overall domestic production capacity of OCTG, it is evident that Indian producers must rely substantially on export markets to manage their OCTG production volumes.

Imposition of trade measures by Canada and other jurisdictions on India

[149] Information on the record indicates that there have been at least seven other measures in other jurisdictions including Mexico, Türkiye and the United States, on an assortment of seamless and welded steel pipe and tube products including OCTG.^{Footnote 62}

[150] In addition to these measures, at the time of this expiry review, the CBSA has anti-dumping measures in force for the following steel products originating in or exported from India:^{Footnote 63}

• Corrosion-resistant steel sheet
• Carbon steel welded pipe
• Falt hot-rolled carbon and alloy steel sheets and strips and
• Steel wire

[151] In January 2026, the United States concluded its sunset review on OCTG, and determined an anti-dumping rate for Indian exports of up to 11.24%.^{Footnote 64}

[152] The CBSA finds that the imposition of the numerous anti-dumping measures on various steel products demonstrates that producers in India have a propensity to dump. Should the CITT’s finding expire, OCTG producers in India would be attracted to the Canadian market which may increase the likelihood of continued or resumed dumping of subject goods into Canada.

Determination regarding likelihood of continued or resumed dumping

[153] Based on evidence on the record in respect of: commodity nature of OCTG; capital-intensive nature of steel production; tariffs and safeguard measures on steel imports and diversion of OCTG into Canada; India’s production and excess capacity; OCTG producers’ dependency on exports; and imposition of trade measures on tube and pipe products by Canada and other jurisdictions on India, the CBSA determined that the expiry of the order is likely to result in the continuation or resumption of dumping of certain OCTG from India.

Indonesia

[154] The CBSA did not receive an ERQ response, case brief or reply submission from the exporters in Indonesia. The CBSA, therefore, relied on information submitted by the Canadian producers as well as other information on the administrative record, in considering whether the dumping of certain OCTG from Indonesia is likely to resume or continue if the order was to expire.

Indonesia’s production capacity and export dependency

[155] Information on the record indicates that Indonesia has substantial production capacity for OCTG. There are several producers of certain OCTG in Indonesia, i.e., PT Citra Tubindo Tbk, PT Rainbow Tubulars Manufacture (Rainbow Tubular) and PT Bakrie Pipe Industries. In addition, Indonesia has other welded and seamless pipe producers that are licensed by the American Petroleum Institute (API) to manufacture API-5CT specification.^{Footnote 65}

[156] In addition to the already large existing production capacity in Indonesia, Rainbow Tubular is adding further capacity with the construction of a second OCTG production facility.^{Footnote 66} This expansion only increases the OCTG production capacity in Indonesia at a time when the OCTG domestic market is facing challenges as a result of the aging producing fields and the reduction of exploration permits for oil and gas.^{Footnote 67} Additionally, the domestic market as witnessed an influx of OCTG imports from China, which increased by 116 % from 2022 to 2024.^{Footnote 68}

[157] These developments indicate that OCTG producers have the potential to direct surplus production to export markets, particularly the Canadian market, if the order was to expire.

Inability to compete at non-dumped prices

[158] During the POI of the original investigation, import volumes of OCTG from Indonesia represented 1.9% of total imports into Canada from all countries.^{Footnote 69} During the POR, there were no imports of OCTG from Indonesia to Canada.^{Footnote 70} The absence of imports during the POR and the lack of participation by Indonesian producers and exporters in both this expiry review and the most recent re-investigation all suggest that Indonesian OCTG producers are unable to compete in the Canadian market at non-dumped prices.

Imposition of trade measures by Canada and other jurisdictions on Indonesia

[159] Insofar as to trade measures on steel tube and pipe products from Indonesia, evidence on the record indicates that anti-dumping measures have previously been imposed by Türkiye.^{Footnote 71} Canada has anti-dumping measures in force on other steel products, notably, on concrete reinforcing rebar^{Footnote 72} and steel plate^{Footnote 73} from Indonesia.

Determination regarding likelihood of continued or resumed dumping

[160] Based on evidence on the record in respect of: commodity nature of OCTG; capital-intensive nature of steel production; tariffs and safeguard measures on steel imports and diversion of OCTG into Canada; Indonesia’s production capacity and export dependency; Indonesian exporters inability to compete at non-dumped prices; and the imposition of trade measures by Canada and other jurisdictions on Indonesia, the CBSA determined that the expiry of the order is likely to result in the continuation or resumption of dumping of certain OCTG from Indonesia.

South Korea

[161] The CBSA did not receive an ERQ response, case brief or reply submission from the exporters in Korea. The CBSA, therefore, relied on information submitted by the Canadian producers as well as other information on the administrative record, in considering whether the dumping of certain OCTG from Korea is likely to resume or continue if the order was to expire.

Continued dumping over the period of review

[162] CBSA enforcement data indicates that subject goods from Korea continued to be dumped throughout the POR. With the exception of 2022, SIMA duties were collected on Korean OCTG imports in every year of the period.

[163] During the POR, Korean OCTG progressively entered the Canadian market at below-market prices and was assessed SIMA duties. Import volumes from Korea surged dramatically, rising over 4,000% in the first three quarters of 2025 compared to full-year 2024 levels. Notably, SIMA duties collected in this nine-month period substantially surpassed the totals recorded in each of the previous three years.^{Footnote 74}

[164] This sharp increase in low-priced imports has likely disrupted the Canadian domestic market, as Korean exporters may be relying on dumping practices to expand their market share. This pattern confirms that Korean exporters are unable to compete in the Canadian market at non-dumped prices and will likely revert to dumping if the order is rescinded.

Imposition of trade measures by Canada and other jurisdictions on South Korea

[165] Information on the record indicates that there have been at least thirteen other measures in other jurisdictions including Australia, the European Union, Mexico, Thailand and the United States, on an assortment of seamless and welded steel pipe and tube products including OCTG.^{Footnote 75}

[166] In addition to these measures, at the time of this expiry review, the CBSA has anti-dumping measures in force for the following steel products originating in or exported from Korea:^{Footnote 76}

• Corrosion-resistant steel sheet
• Cold-rolled steel
• Carbon steel welded pipe
• Hollow structural sections
• Line pipe
• Steel plate and
• Concrete reinforcing bar

[167] In January 2026, the United States concluded its sunset review on OCTG, and determined an anti-dumping rate for Korean exports of up to 6.49%.^{Footnote 77}

[168] The CBSA finds that the imposition of the numerous anti-dumping measures on various steel products demonstrates that producers in Korea have a propensity to dump. Should the CITT’s finding expire, OCTG producers in Korea would be attracted to the Canadian market which may increase the likelihood of continued or resumed dumping of subject goods into Canada.

Determination regarding likelihood of continued or resumed dumping

[169] Based on evidence on the record in respect of: commodity nature of OCTG; capital-intensive nature of steel production; tariffs and safeguard measures on steel imports and diversion of OCTG into Canada; the continued dumping over the period of review; and the imposition of trade measures by Canada and other jurisdictions on South Korea, the CBSA determined that the expiry of the order is likely to result in the continuation or resumption of dumping of certain OCTG from South Korea.

Thailand

[170] The CBSA did not receive an ERQ response, case brief or reply submission from the exporters in Thailand. The CBSA, therefore, relied on information submitted by the Canadian producers as well as other information on the administrative record, in considering whether the dumping of certain OCTG from Thailand is likely to resume or continue if the order was to expire.

Continued dumping over the period of review

[171] CBSA enforcement data shows that during the POR, subject goods remained dumped. In every year of the POR, SIMA duties were collected from OCTG products subject to this measure from Thailand.

[172] During the POR, Thai OCTG entered the Canadian market at below-market prices and was consistently assessed SIMA duties. Import volumes from Thailand surged dramatically, rising 641% in the first three quarters of 2025 compared to full-year 2024 levels. Notably, SIMA duties collected in this nine-month period have already surpassed the totals recorded in each of the previous three years.^{Footnote 78}

[173] This sharp increase in low-priced imports has likely disrupted the Canadian domestic market, as Thai exporters may be relying on dumping practices to expand their market share. This pattern confirms that Thai exporters are unable to compete in the Canadian market at non-dumped prices and will likely revert to dumping if the order is rescinded.

Imposition of trade measures by Canada and other jurisdictions on Thailand

[174] Information on the record indicates that there have been at least five other measures in other jurisdictions including Brazil, India, Türkiye and the United States, on welded stainless steel pipes and tubes, welded stainless pressure pipe, welded carbon steel pipes and tubes, seamed tubes, tube and pipe fittings, and OCTG.^{Footnote 79}

[175] In addition to these measures, at the time of this expiry review, the CBSA has anti-dumping measures in force for the following steel products originating in or exported from Thailand:^{Footnote 80}

• Carbon steel welded pipe
• Concrete reinforcing bar and
• Steel wire

[176] The CBSA finds that the imposition of the numerous anti-dumping measures on various steel products demonstrates that producers in Thailand have a propensity to dump. Should the CITT’s finding expire, OCTG producers in Thailand would be attracted to the Canadian market which may increase the likelihood of continued or resumed dumping of subject goods into Canada.

Determination regarding likelihood of continued or resumed dumping

[177] Based on evidence on the record in respect of: commodity nature of OCTG; capital-intensive nature of steel production; tariffs and safeguard measures on steel imports and diversion of OCTG into Canada; the continued dumping over the period of review; and the imposition of trade measures by Canada and other jurisdictions on Thailand, the CBSA determined that the expiry of the order is likely to result in the continuation or resumption of dumping of certain OCTG from Thailand.

Türkiye

The CBSA did not receive an ERQ response, case brief or reply submission from the exporters in Türkiye. The CBSA, therefore, relied on information submitted by the Canadian producers as well as other information on the administrative record, in considering whether the dumping of certain OCTG from Türkiye is likely to resume or continue if the order was to expire.

Inability to compete at non-dumped prices

[178] During the POI of the original investigation, import volumes of OCTG from Türkiye represented 5.4% of total imports into Canada from all countries.^{Footnote 81} During the POR, there were no imports of OCTG from Türkiye to Canada.^{Footnote 82}

[179] The absence of imports during the POR and the lack of participation by Turkish producers and exporters in both this expiry review and the most recent re-investigation all suggest that Turkish OCTG producers are unable to compete in the Canadian market at non-dumped prices.

Imposition of trade measures by Canada and other jurisdictions on Türkiye

[180] Information on the record indicates that there are six other measures in the United States on an assortment of steel pipe and tube products including OCTG against Türkiye.^{Footnote 83}

[181] In addition to these measures, at the time of this expiry review, the CBSA has anti-dumping measures in force for the following steel products originating in or exported from Türkiye:^{Footnote 84}

• Corrosion-resistant steel sheet
• Carbon steel welded pipe
• Hollow structural sections
• Concrete reinforcing bar
• Steel strapping and
• Steel wire

[182] In January 2026, the United States concluded its sunset review on OCTG, and determined an anti-dumping rate for Turkish exports of up to 35.86%.^{Footnote 85}

[183] The CBSA finds that the imposition of the numerous anti-dumping measures on various steel products demonstrates that producers in Türkiye have a propensity to dump. Should the CITT’s finding expire, OCTG producers in Türkiye would be attracted to the Canadian market which may increase the likelihood of continued or resumed dumping of subject goods into Canada.

Determination regarding likelihood of continued or resumed dumping

[184] Based on evidence on the record in respect of: commodity nature of OCTG; capital-intensive nature of steel production; tariffs and safeguard measures on steel imports and diversion of OCTG into Canada; Turkish exporters’ inability to compete at non-dumped prices; and the imposition of trade measures by Canada and other jurisdictions on Türkiye, the CBSA determined that the expiry of the order is likely to result in the continuation or resumption of dumping of certain OCTG from Türkiye.

Ukraine

[185] The CBSA received an ERQ response, case brief and reply submission from Niko Tube, a producer and exporter located in Ukraine. The CBSA relied on the information submitted by this producer/exporter, the Canadian producers as well as other information on the administrative record, in considering whether the dumping of certain OCTG from Ukraine is likely to resume or continue if the order was to expire.

Ukraine’s OCTG production capacity and excess capacity

[186] Information provided in the confidential response by Niko Tube disclosed the producers effective capacity to produce OCTG products. Evidence on the record indicates that the utilization rate declined in the first nine months of 2025, resulting in quantity of excess capacity that is not considered insignificant.

[187] The CBSA therefore finds that significant excess production capacity exists in Ukraine. Given the capital-intensive nature of OCTG production and the high fixed costs involved, mills have a strong incentive to pursue sales, even at low prices, to improve capacity utilization. As such, should the CITT’s order expire, Canada represents an attractive market for the OCTG producer in the Ukraine to eliminate excess production capacity which may increase the likelihood of continued or resumed dumping of subject goods into Canada.

OCTG producer’s dependency on exports

[188] Evidence on the record shows that Niko Tube continues to sell meaningful volumes of OCTG in export markets. Furthermore, during the POR, Niko Tube exported OCTG to numerous countries, which are included the following regions: Europe, Middle East & Africa, Americas and Central Asia.^{Footnote 86}

[189] Prior to June 4, 2025, the United States had suspended the 25% tariff of Section 232 Measures on Ukrainian steel, which includes OCTG. With the revocation of the suspension for Ukraine, OCTG are now subject to a 50% tariff.^{Footnote 87}

[190] Due to the geographic proximity of the United States to Canada, and with Niko Tube’s established network distribution in the Americas, the imposition of this 50% tariff could potential divert OCTG to Canada.

Imposition of trade measures by other jurisdictions on Ukraine

[191] Information on the record indicates that there have been at least ten other measures in other jurisdictions including Armenia, Brazil, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Reo and the United States, on seamless steel pipes and tubes including OCTG.^{Footnote 88}

[192] In addition, as mentioned above, the United States has a tariff of 50% on steel products and also an anti-dumping rate on OCTG from Ukraine exported by Niko Tube of 1.39%.^{Footnote 89}

[193] The CBSA finds that the imposition of these anti-dumping measures on steel products in other jurisdictions and on OCTG in the United States demonstrate that the producer in Ukraine has a propensity to dump. Should the CITT’s order expire, the OCTG producer in Ukraine would be attracted to the Canadian market which may increase the likelihood of continued or resumed dumping of subject goods into Canada.

Determination regarding likelihood of continued or resumed dumping

[194] Based on evidence on the record in respect of: commodity nature of OCTG; capital-intensive nature of steel production; tariffs and safeguard measures on steel imports and diversion of OCTG into Canada; Ukraine’s OCTG production capacity and excess capacity; OCTG producer’s dependency on exports; and the imposition of trade measures by Canada and other jurisdictions on Ukraine, the CBSA determined that the expiry of the order is likely to result in the continuation or resumption of dumping of certain OCTG from Ukraine.

Vietnam

[195] The CBSA did not receive an ERQ response, case brief or reply submission from the exporters in Vietnam. The CBSA, therefore, relied on information submitted by the Canadian producers as well as other information on the administrative record, in considering whether the dumping of certain OCTG from Vietnam is likely to resume or continue if the order was to expire.

Inability to compete at non-dumped prices

[196] During the POI of the original investigation, import volumes of OCTG from Vietnam represented 2.7% of total imports into Canada from all countries.^{Footnote 90} During the POR, aside from a negligible volume imported in 2022, there were no imports of OCTG from Vietnam to Canada. Notably, even the minimal 2022 imports were assessed SIMA duties.^{Footnote 91}

[197] The absence of imports during the POR, the SIMA duties applied to the small volume that did enter Canada, and the lack of participation by Vietnamese producers and exporters in both this expiry review and the most recent re-investigation all suggest that Vietnam’s OCTG producers are unable to compete in the Canadian market at non-dumped prices.

Imposition of trade measures by Canada and other jurisdictions on Vietnam

[198] Information on the record indicates that there have been at least seven other measures in other jurisdictions including Brazil, India, Thailand, Türkiye and the United States, on welded stainless steel pipes and tubes, welded stainless pressure pipe, iron steel pipe and tube, and OCTG.^{Footnote 92}

[199] In addition to these measures, at the time of this expiry review, the CBSA has anti-dumping measures in force for the following steel products originating in or exported from Vietnam:^{Footnote 93}

• Corrosion-resistant steel sheet
• Cold-rolled steel
• Carbon steel welded pipe
• Concrete reinforcing bar
• Steel wire and
• Wire rod

[200] In January 2026, the United States completed its sunset review of OCTG and imposed an anti-dumping duty on Vietnamese exports of up to 111.47%.^{Footnote 94} Similarly, in January 2025, the CBSA concluded its re-investigation of OCTG from the subject countries and determined an anti-dumping duty rate of 37.4% on imports from Vietnam.^{Footnote 95}

[201] The CBSA finds that the imposition of numerous anti-dumping measures on various steel products demonstrates that producers in Vietnam have a propensity to dump. Should the CITT’s finding expire, OCTG producers in Vietnam would be attracted to the Canadian market which may increase the likelihood of continued or resumed dumping of subject goods into Canada.

Determination regarding likelihood of continued or resumed dumping

[202] Based on evidence on the record in respect of the commodity nature of OCTG, capital-intensive nature of steel production, tariffs and safeguard measures on steel imports and diversion of OCTG into Canada, Vietnamese exporters’ inability to compete at non-dumped prices, and the imposition of trade measures by Canada and other jurisdictions on Vietnam, the CBSA determined that the expiry of the order is likely to result in the continuation or resumption of dumping of certain OCTG from Vietnam.