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Fact sheets: Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security—Supplementary Estimates (B), 2024 to 2025 (December 3, 2024)

ArriveCAN / Contracting and Procurement / CBSA internal audits and plans

Issue: Publication of the CBSA's Audit of Contracting and Procurement and Audit of Internal Control over Financial Reporting.

Key message

The CBSA undertook these internal audits to assess and improve its contract and procurement practices.

The Agency has already taken steps to address the recommendations.

Of the many changes made, the Agency has established a centre of procurement expertise and strengthened governance to ensure alignment with Government of Canada policies and regulations and stewardship of public funds.

Background

On , the CBSA posted two internal audits on its website: The Audit of Contracting and Procurement and the Audit of Internal Control over Financial Reporting. Additionally, the CBSA will be posting new information on its website summarizing actions taken to-date by the Agency and next steps in its plan to further strengthen contracting and procurement processes.

The CBSA has taken many steps to strengthen management and oversight of the procurement process. In total, the Agency has implemented 13 of the 23 recommendations related to procurement made in various audits in the last two years.

Some of the actions taken and planned by the CBSA as part of its procurement improvement plan include:

  1. all managers and executives with procurement authority have re-taken procurement training courses
  2. created an Executive Procurement Review Committee to provide oversight on all contracting activities with a focus on delivering value for money
  3. requiring employees to disclose all interactions with potential vendors
  4. established a centre of expertise to help employees fully understand their obligations and authorities

The remaining recommendations will be implemented by the spring of 2025.

Sanctions against Russia

Issue: Media has reported that even with sanctions being imposed restricting the supply of goods and technologies to Russia, there are cases of Canadian products being supplied.

Key message

Since the start of the Russian invasion on the Ukraine, the CBSA risk-assessed over 1.4 million export declarations and referred 211 shipments for detention and examination.

These detentions resulted in over 190 enforcement actions, preventing the export of approximately $14 million worth of goods.

Approximately $860,000 of goods were seized by the CBSA due to suspected sanctions violations.

The CBSA works closely with national and international partners to identify, deter, prevent, and investigate efforts to ship restricted goods and technologies to Russia, both directly and via third countries.

On , Canada withdrew the Most Favoured Nation (MFN) tariff for goods exported from Russia, with the exception of goods that were already in transit before this date. Since that time, almost all goods originating in Russia, including fertilizers, are subject to a tariff rate of 35 percent under the General Tariff.

The CBSA has conducted trade compliance verifications involving goods impacted by the withdrawal of MFN status. As a result, approximately $725,000 in duty has been assessed to date.

Background

The Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) facilitates the flow of legitimate travelers and trade and enforces more than 100 acts and regulations that keep our country and communities safe. With respect to the import and export of commercial goods, the CBSA carries out regulatory enforcement (such as seizures and the issuing of monetary penalties) and investigates those who violate the rules and regulations.

The CBSA is responsible for enforcing Canada's strategic export controls and Canada's sanctions regime within an import/export context. The CBSA drives regulatory enforcement, while also sharing the responsibility to investigate potential criminal sanctions violations with the Royal Canadian Mounted Police.

Criminal investigations can be conducted independently or in partnership with law enforcement partners. Ultimately, if the violations are supported by evidence, criminal charge recommendations are submitted to the Public Prosecution Services of Canada for criminal prosecution.

The CBSA's enforcement efforts also allow us to identify and stop state and non-state actors engaging in potentially illicit activity. The Agency enforces sanctions through import and export controls in order to prevent the procurement of sensitive Canadian goods and technologies by illicit proliferation networks.

The CBSA works closely with the Government of Canada (GC) stakeholders, including Global Affairs Canada, the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission and other security and intelligence partners, to ensure relevant laws and regulations are enforced. We ensure that all new or amended sanctions and export controls are operationalized through our risk assessment process.

The Counter Proliferation Operations Section is an intelligence unit based at the CBSA's Headquarters in Ottawa. It is responsible for screening every export declaration made to the CBSA and assessing these for export violation and sanctions evasion risks. It provides direct intelligence support to the CBSA's Border Services Officers at Canada's Ports of Exit. They use their authorities under the Customs Act to ensure that goods being exported from Canada comply with the export reporting requirements. The Section identifies shipments that may contravene Canada's export controls and makes referrals to the relevant ports of exit, recommending interception, examination and detention.

Despite international efforts, Russia maintains extensive capabilities to acquire Western goods and technologies. Russia's proliferation networks exploit legislative, regulatory and capability gaps by employing various tactics, such as transshipment, to circumvent export controls and sanctions. The Agency has noted that many of the exporters whose shipments we have detained in relation to Russian sanctions have now stopped exporting to that country. However, third countries are used as transshipment points and false end-user information is often provided as a tactic to evade Canadian exporters' due diligence.

The CBSA has established and chairs the Sanctions and Border Enforcement Coordination Committee within the GC to enhance interdepartmental cooperation on information sharing and to find ways to improve coordination related to sanctions enforcement. The CBSA also hosted the first E5 (Export Enforcement group of the Five Eyes) meeting in to support the work of integrated export enforcement with our international allies. This meeting was designed to share information and best practices on export and sanctions enforcement.

In addition to formal sanctions, on , Canada withdrew the Most Favoured Nation (MFN) tariff for almost all goods exported from Russia, with the exception of goods that were already in transit before this date. In accordance with section 17(1), 17(2) and 18(1)(a) of the Customs Tariff Act (direct shipment and transhipment) importers must provide a through bill of lading to a consignee in Canada in order to provide evidence that goods were in transit.

Since the revocation of MFN status and after a period of adjustment, importers appear to have largely sourced goods from other countries rather than continue to import from Russia and/or Belarus.

As part of its normal trade compliance workload, since and as of CBSA has closed 37 trade compliance verifications involving goods impacted by the withdrawal of MFN status from Russia and another 15 are in progress. Of the 37 closed files, 27 have confirmed non-compliance and a total of $724,956.84 in duty has been assessed. Almost all of these files have focused on whether goods were in transit to Canada prior to .

Auto theft

Key message

Auto theft is a growing challenge in Ontario, Quebec and across the country. It increasingly involves organized crime groups, and the proceeds of these thefts are used to fund other illegal activities. There is no single solution to this complex problem.

The Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) provides critical support to law enforcement partners to disrupt, investigate and ultimately prosecute these crimes. Upfront, preventative and investigative work—within Canada and ahead of reaching our borders—is imperative to reduce auto theft overall.

Nationally, the CBSA has increased its efforts, and as of , has intercepted 2,159 stolen vehicles so far this year. This compared to the 1,804 stolen vehicles intercepted by the CBSA in 2023.

Through the National Action Plan on Combatting Auto Theft, the Government of Canada (GC) is moving forward with (1) legislative and regulatory changes, (2) intelligence and information sharing enhancements and (3) intervention improvements.

Legislative and regulatory changes:

  • The CBSA is working with the Department of Justice to assess legal authorities to determine areas for improvement with respect to ensuring that export legislation and regulations provide to the GC (including the CBSA) the right tools to identify stolen vehicles bound for export

Intelligence and information sharing enhancements:

  • The CBSA continues to support Police of Jurisdiction stolen vehicle criminal investigations through existing information sharing authorities by sharing customs information
  • The CBSA has prioritized efforts to provide timely responses to Requests for Information from police partners received from POJs and as of , has responded to 2,290 requests so far this year

Intervention improvements:

  • In , the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) deployed additional scanning technology in the Greater Toronto Area to increase the effectiveness of the CBSA's ability to examine cargo containers at area intermodal facilities destined for export
  • The Royal Canadian Mounted Police, in collaboration with the CBSA and local police, developed and implemented a Protocol for Interjurisdictional Law Enforcement Requests, to locate stolen vehicles equipped with tracking devices for law enforcement, which was widely distributed to law enforcement agencies in Canada in June

Background

The recent rise in vehicle thefts across Canada has necessitated a response from Canada's Public Safety Portfolio partners. The issue is of particular concern in Halifax, Montreal, and Toronto, where a rising number of vehicle thefts have been reported or where stolen vehicles have been recovered during an attempt to export the commodity from Canada.

The Action Plan on Combatting Auto Theft outlines concrete short, medium and long-term actions, planned or already underway, that were confirmed by participants, following the Summit. This plan takes a multi-dimensional approach to disrupting auto theft, organized along five pillars: intelligence or information sharing; prevention; intervention; legislation, regulations, and governance; and recovery and repatriation.

The $28 million investment over five years underscores the Canada Border Services Agency's (CBSA) commitment to collaborating with law enforcement counterparts to proactively uncover and exchange information to combat illicit activities. This funding will bolster the Agency's capabilities in detecting and inspecting containers containing stolen vehicles, while also strengthening cooperation and information exchanges with partners both domestically and abroad to apprehend individuals involved in such crimes.

Action plan specific CBSA pillar items

Intelligence and information sharing

  • The CBSA continues to support Police of Jurisdiction (POJ) stolen vehicle criminal investigations through existing information sharing authorities by sharing customs information. The CBSA collaborates with multiple police forces, including but not limited to the: Ontario Provincial Police (OPP); Sûreté du Québec; Royal Canadian Mounted Police; and police forces across Canada to support their stolen vehicle criminal investigations through expanded information sharing
  • The CBSA has prioritized efforts to provide timely responses to Requests for Information from police partners received from POJs and as of November 18 has responded to 2,290 requests so far this year
  • The CBSA continues to be an active partner in the Joint Intelligence Group (JIG) led by the OPP
  • The OPP-led JIG, which was first established for Project Emission with CBSA membership in late , continues to coordinate the sharing of intelligence and information on auto thefts to drive investigations. The CBSA has two intelligence analysts directly supporting the JIG. Additionally, the CBSA continues to assist POJs on other projects targeting auto theft groups such as Project Vector, Ninja, Odyssey, Spectre, Chickadee and others
  • Port operators, intermodal facility operators and other business organizations have been engaged to increase awareness of the Canada Border Services Agency's (CBSA) enforcement efforts, while soliciting their support to address the exploitation of Canada's legitimate trade chain
  • The CBSA has engaged with the Border 5 (Canada, United States, United Kingdom, Australia, and New Zealand) to solicit best practices and share Canada' Stolen Vehicle export enforcement activities

Intervention

  • The CBSA has been using the Heimann Cargo Vision Mobile in the Canadian Pacific Kansas City (Canadian rail holding company) yard in Vaughan
    • As of , 39 containers have been scanned and 4 stolen vehicles have been intercepted, this year
  • The CBSA, with the collaboration of the RCMP, is using the RCMP's Mobile Z Backscatter Imaging System (ZBV) in the Canadian National Railway (Canadian railway company) railyard in Brampton
    • As of , 149 containers have been scanned and 4 stolen vehicles have been intercepted, so far this year. Additional containers were referred for examination to confirm if they contain stolen vehicles. These examinations have been completed, and the vehicles and parts inside were legitimate shipments. The scanning technology also permitted the interception of numerous vehicle parts. However none of those containers that were scanned came back with having stolen vehicle parts inside. They were all legitimate shipments
  • $9.1 million will be extended to provincial, territorial and municipal police forces through the Contribution Program to Combat Serious and Organized Crime related to this initiative

Legislation, regulations and governance

  • The CBSA is working with the Department of Justice to assess legal authorities to determine areas for improvement with respect to ensuring that export legislation and regulations provide to the Government of Canada (including the CBSA) the right tools to identify stolen vehicles bound for export
  • Amendments to the Radiocommunication Act were completed in to regulate the sale, distribution and importation of radio devices that are believed to be used to intercept communications for criminal activity, such as auto theft. Innovation, Science and Economic Development Canada conducted a public consultation on this topic - comments were accepted until
  • On , the federal government introduced Bill C-69, An Act to implement certain provisions of the budget tabled in Parliament, which received Royal Assent on
  • Bill C-69, enacted on , introduced several measures to combat motor vehicle theft:

    New offences targeting:

    • Violence used, threatened, or attempted during auto theft
    • Thefts linked to organized crime
    • Laundering proceeds of crime for criminal organizations
    • Possession and distribution of electronic devices for auto theft
  • New aggravating factor at sentencing for adults involving youth in offences, including auto theft
  • Enhanced investigative tools:
    • Wiretap warrants and DNA orders now available for auto theft offences
  • Increased maximum penalty for carjacking from 10 to 14 years

Firearms

Key message

The Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) is responsible for ensuring the safety and security of Canadians while facilitating legitimate trade and travel across Canada's borders. This includes protecting communities by combatting the movement of illegal firearms into Canada.

The CBSA collaborates with law enforcement partners to share intelligence, build a threat picture, and conduct joint enforcement operations. For example, the Cross-Border Firearms Task Force was established in 2021 to reduce gun violence. Its main focus is to scope and identify methods to counter firearms smuggling across the Canada-U.S. border.

The Government of Canada committed $312 million over five years in Budget 2021 (starting in the 2021 to 2022 fiscal year) and $41.4 million per year ongoing, for the CBSA, Public Safety, and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), to enhance Canada's firearm control framework.

Of the amount committed, the Government is investing $35.7 million into the CBSA to strengthen border controls to prevent firearm smuggling into Canada.

In 2023, the CBSA had 668 firearm seizures, preventing 900 firearms from entering Canada.

From to , the CBSA had 388 firearms seizures, preventing 491 firearms from entering Canada.

Between January 1 and , the CBSA's Criminal Investigations Program opened 95 firearms-related investigations and laid charges in 52. During this period, the courts convicted in 26 cases.

Background

The CBSA is responsible for ensuring the safety and security of Canadians while facilitating legitimate trade and travel across Canada's borders. Specifically, the Agency helps to protect Canadian communities by combatting the movement of illegal firearms into Canada. The CBSA has 8,700 frontline staff.

In support of its efforts to identify, disrupt, interdict, and take enforcement action against gun smuggling activities, the CBSA collaborates with law enforcement partners to share intelligence, build a shared threat picture, and conduct joint enforcement operations. Such collaboration includes participation in the Cross Border Firearms Task Force, the Cross Border Crime Forum, and various activities that fall under the Cross Border Law Enforcement Advisory Committee and Liaison Group. Each of these four present opportunities for increased collaboration and information sharing between Canadian (for example, CBSA and Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP)) and United States law enforcement partners (for example, Customs and Border Protection, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms).

The Cross-Border Firearms Task Force was established as a result of the shared commitment made by Prime Minister Trudeau and President Biden to reduce gun violence in 2021. Its main focus is to scope and identify methods to counter firearms smuggling across the Canada-United States (U.S.) border. The work done by the Task Force ensures that law enforcement partners on both sides of the border benefit from shared intelligence to enable the detection and interception of illicit firearms. Members collaborate with relevant domestic government agencies and international organizations to combat the threat posed by smuggled firearms, firearm parts, and devices prohibited from export or import, as well as target the financing, assets obtained through this illicit activity, and other illicit commodities used to acquire this contraband.

Given a priority focus on the firearms issue, the CBSA has developed integrated regional firearms teams in Ontario, Quebec and the Prairies. These cross-functional teams, made up of intelligence officers, analysts, and criminal investigators, bring together essential expertise and provide a single point of contact for timely collaboration with U.S. and domestic law enforcement partners to disrupt gun smuggling.

On , CBSA and U.S. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) signed a Memorandum of Understanding to allow for the direct sharing of information. As both CBSA and the Bureau share a common mandate to protect their citizens from violence associated with illicit firearms, being able to share information and intelligence quickly is imperative.

The GC continues to invest in people, tools and technology to combat firearms smuggling and trafficking. They committed $312 million over five years in Budget 2021, starting in 2021 to 2022, and $41.4 million per year ongoing for Public Safety , CBSA, and the RCMP to enhance Canada's firearm control framework. The GC is also investing $35.7 million for the CBSA to strengthen border controls to prevent firearms smuggling into Canada. This is in addition to the $92.9 million in funding allocated to the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) from 2018 to 2019 to 2023 to 2024 under the Initiative to Take Action Against Gun and Gang Violence.

Stats / Analysis

The number of firearms sent for tracing by the CBSA has increased from 549 firearms in 2022, to 665Footnote 1 firearms in 2023. The significant increase (+21% year-over-year) is largely attributed to the implementation of a CBSA firearms tracing policy which took effect in , requiring all seized firearms to be submitted for tracing.

Mid-year 2024 (January to June) firearm seizures remain relatively consistent with mid-year 2023. Year-end quantities are highly likely to be similar to 2023 barring a high quantity enforcement.

While Privately Made Firearms (PMF) make up a small percentage of the firearms seized at the border, It is expected that the CBSA will see increases in border interceptions of regulated PMFs and related parts.

Highway mode remains the most common mode for firearm interceptions, with firearm seizures up 13% and quantities seized remaining consistent with mid-year 2023. The postal/courier mode was the second most common mode of interception, seeing decreased seizures in the first half of 2024. Notably, Prima Facie Crime Gun (PFCG) interceptions are up in the first half of 2024, driven largely by small quantity land border seizures.

The CBSA expects to intercept an increasing number of firearms deeply concealed within personal vehicles by year end 2024, largely influenced by increased land border traveller volumes.

Between January 1 and , the CBSA's Criminal Investigations Program opened 95 firearms-related investigations and laid charges in 52. During this period, the courts imposed guilty convictions in 26 cases.

From , to , the CBSA opened 450 criminal investigations into firearms offences; many of these investigations are ongoing. During the same period, the CBSA laid charges in 208 cases involving firearms, some of which are still before the courts. Also during this period, the courts imposed guilty convictions in 109 cases.

Recent successes

CBSA Officers working at the International Mail Processing Centre in Mississauga intercepted a package in . The package was bound for a Toronto address and following examination was found to contained three prohibited semi-automatic handguns, five cartridge magazines and twelve rounds of ammunition. A CBSA investigation led to the arrest of a 34-year-old Toronto resident for multiple firearms related offences following the execution of search warrant assisted by the Toronto Police Emergency Task Force.

In , the CBSA announced charges have been laid against a Manitoba resident for firearms-related offences. This complex investigation was led by the CBSA, with assistance from the Winnipeg Police Service, RCMP and Manitoba Conservation. In , CBSA officers at the Winnipeg Land Commercial office examined a shipment which was found to contain items related to the manufacture of privately made firearms, or "ghost" guns.

Drugs and precursors

Key message

The CBSA is vigilant in the interdiction of illegal drugs to ensure these harmful substances remain off our streets. The Agency seizes fentanyl and other controlled substances, in addition to precursor chemicals that can be used in the production of illegal synthetic drugs.

The CBSA increased its capacity to disrupt the flow of illicit synthetic drugs by:

  • Introducing strengthened authorities in 2017 to examine all packages, regardless of weight, on reasonable grounds to suspect contraband
  • equipping ports of entry with detection technology and other necessary equipment to make it safer for officers to examine goods
  • maintaining regional satellite laboratories staffed by field chemists in high-risk locations
  • deploying additional detector dog teams trained to recognize the scent illicit drugs

The CBSA works closely with international partners through collaborative targeting, and currently has embedded officers within the US and Australian Targeting Centers.

From January 1 to , the CBSA seized more than 10,000 kg of cannabis products, 555 g of fentanyl, 115 kg of other opioids, 2,900 kg of cocaine, and 1.7 kg of heroin.

Background

The CBSA is responsible for administering and enforcing the Customs Act at the ports of entry (POEs), including preventing the importation or exportation of goods that are prohibited, controlled or restricted under any Act of Parliament. This includes items scheduled by Health Canada under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act (CDSA). The CBSA does this by developing intelligence on suspected shipments and entities, targeting suspect shipments for examination, examining those shipments at ports of entry, and where contraband is found, seizing that contraband and arresting accompanying individuals. The CBSA's Intelligence program plays a key role in the identification of border-related threats and in protecting the safety and security of Canadians and works closely with other law enforcement agencies, including the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) and Police of Jurisdiction.

  • The current border threat related to fentanyl involves the smuggling of fentanyl precursor chemicals from China. Although fentanyl precursor seizures in the first half of 2024 have dropped significantly, domestic production of fentanyl and other synthetic drugs (MDMA, methamphetamine) persists, as is evident in the recent RCMP discovery of the largest drug super-lab in Canadian history in British Columbia
  • While recent amendments to Chinese regulations has stemmed the flow of some precursor chemicals, chemical manufacturers and exporters are quick to pivot. When one precursor is scheduled, historically, chemists shift to a new non-scheduled chemical to produce fentanyl
  • The successful changes in modus operandi by traffickers have likely resulted in a considerable underestimation of drug smuggling activities in the first half of 2024. Although there was a notable decrease in the amount of various drugs and precursors seized, excluding cocaine, intelligence reports suggest a substantial drug supply in Canada along with reduced street prices
  • E-commerce has shifted the way business is done, with any citizen able to easily import goods to themselves, and foreign entities able to send goods to anyone. Postal and courier streams, once focused on communication and care packages, have shifted to become import streams. They are relatively anonymous, and that anonymity can be exploited by threat actors taking advantage of expedited clearance expectations on tens of thousands of small packages in one shipment, making it more difficult to find the needle in the haystack. The increased demands to process more commercial goods, such as parcels, or air travel, is allowing organized crime groups to develop complex smuggling methodologies in all modes in concert with infiltrating all areas of the commercial and travel border continuum to facilitate the movement of their contraband
  • There has been a notable surge in drug smuggling among air passengers since 2023, posing a persistent threat to Canada. Cannabis, methamphetamine, and cocaine are among the primary substances involved in this illicit activity. Organized crime groups often take advantage of vulnerable, young, or easily influenced travellers to facilitate the transportation of illegal drugs across Canadian borders. The absence of concealment strongly indicates the regular use of this modus operandi highly likely due to the ample drug availability
  • The rise in the importation of ketamine, benzodiazepines and other opioids, both pharmaceutical and non-pharmaceutical, suggests a significant unmet demand resulting from domestic diversion. These substances are also frequently utilized as cutting agents, misrepresented as different substances, or inadvertently consumed alongside other drugs. Drug traffickers persistently exploit the postal and air courier low value shipment streams, employing minimal concealment methods to smuggle their illicit shipments into Canada, likely due to the accessibility from regions beyond North America
  • Export seizures and reporting of Canadian-origin fentanyl decreased significantly since 2023 yet important quantities of methamphetamine and MDMA were exported to Oceania and Asia, while Cannabis was particularly sent to Europe and Caribbean regions. This trend is highly likely driven by the lucrative demand and increasing profit margins. Drug traffickers highly likely exploit the well-established global transportation and distribution networks, with larger shipments concealed using sophisticated methods in air cargo and marine transportation, whereas smaller to medium-sized shipments less concealed in postal and air courier services for low-value items

The CBSA is the first line of defense to stop the cross-border movement of drugs. The Agency plays a direct role in preventing the illegal importation and exportation of controlled substances to and from Canada. In response to the overdose crisis, the CBSA has increased its capacity to interdict illicit drugs at the border by:

  • The CBSA's National Targeting Centre has stood up an Export Targeting team specifically focused on the threat of illegal narcotics from leaving Canada. The unit's primary responsibility is to analyze export intelligence, data and information to produce targeting-focused intelligence products that support national and international targeting operations. By identifying potential and previously unknown threats within travellers outbound and commercial export streams, the unit enhances Canada's risk assessment processes by uncovering trends, patterns, and indicators that signal potential risks. In collaboration with internal and external partners, the unit ensures the timely distribution of actionable targeting intelligence to countering illicit exports
  • Working closely with our international partners through collaborative targeting. The CBSA currently has embedded officers within the US and Australian Targeting Centers. The US CBP also has an officer embedded within the CBSA's NTC in Ottawa. These front-line officers work directly with their counterparts to support and enable direct, real-time information sharing
  • The CBSA is currently working with the B5 through the International Virtual Targeting Centre and Project Edony. These projects have not resulted in any enforcement actions to date. However, Project Edony, originally designed to counter the insider threat, is now focused on tacking the threat of synthetic opioids within the Fast Parcels/CLVS and postal streams. Our B5 partners awe working quickly to establish agreements with the major couriers to enable results and the CBSA supports this approach
  • Making it safer for BSOs to conduct examinations on goods containing highly toxic substances (HTS) including synthetic drugs like opioids, fentanyl and precursors. All ports of entry are equipped with enhanced personal protective equipment and Naloxone. Moreover, eighty-two (POEs are equipped with designated safe examination areas (DSEAs). These are demarked, segregated areas equipped with fume hoods and detection technology
  • Increasing its capacity to identify unknown substances in the regions through the designated safe sampling areas (DSSAs) in in Montreal (postal), Toronto (postal) and Vancouver (situated in air cargo, but covers all modes). These are regional satellite laboratories where chemists work alongside officers to provide real-time analysis and expert scientific identification of substances. This has resulted in a more efficient release/seize decision process and an increase in controlled deliveries
  • Synthetic drugs and their precursors are continually evolving to meet the demand for new designer drugs and can be specifically formulated to avoid detection at the border. The CBSA requires detection tools with broad detection capabilities to presumptively identify new synthetic drugs and precursors chemicals on the front line. The CBSA Lab has tested Raman handheld tools in the field to allow for the presumptive identification of more than 10,000 substances, including synthetic drugs, precursors and liquids, in addition to providing a detection technology tool for mobile teams
  • The rise in e-commerce has led to major increases in postal and courier volumes processed by the CBSA. As a result, the CBSA has more mobile teams that go between warehouse to clear goods. At this point in time, there are limited mobile detection technology tools to presumptively identify goods making it more difficult to detect contraband
  • The CBSA is currently seeking funds to expand the number of Designated Safe Sampling Areas (DSSAs) . This will allow the Agency to build on the success of the three existing sites to make the identification of substances. In addition to the enforcement benefits, the local identification of unknown substances allows POEs to determine the safe handling, storage and disposal requirements
  • Synthetic drugs and precursors pose health and safety risks to officers while they are conducing examinations. When there are indicators that a substance is illegal, the goods must be shipped (barrels, drums, etc.) to the central lab in Ottawa. To make this process more efficient, the CBSA is exploring methods for officers to safely breach the final layer of packaging to garner a sample (10ml or 1g) of a of suspected illegal substance to send to the central CBSA Lab for analysis. As such, the CBSA is seeking funding for ducted fume hoods to make the process more safe for officers

CARM

Key message

CARM was deployed by the CBSA on October 21. The system is now successfully processing payments and accounting declarations from Importers and Customs Brokers.

Since deployment, CARM has processed over 3.2 million transactions and collected over $2.2 billion in payments for the Government of Canada.

The CBSA is actively working with Government of Canada partners and taking corrective measures when need be to resolve intermittent system issues and outages impacting stakeholders as well as increasing the number of resources on the CARM help desk to respond to the surge in tickets from stakeholders.

CARM replaced a 36-year old system with one that is digital and more accurate. This important milestone follows broad consultation with stakeholders and extensive system testing.

As the Government of Canada's second-largest revenue collector after the Canada Revenue Agency, this new system better equips the CBSA to protect $40 billion a year in revenue for Canadians.

CARM eliminates time-consuming paper-based processes, an improvement that will give importers the ability to submit accounting documents and receive notifications digitally.

Background

The CARM project is a multi-year initiative to modernize the imposition and levying of duties and taxes on goods imported into Canada. CARM is expected to result in improved compliance with trade rules, reduce lost Government of Canada revenue, and simplify the import process for trade chain partners.

On , the sixth major release of CARM was implemented for internal use at the CBSA. This release has been through extensive testing, including over 7,200 test scripts and two rounds of the CARM Experience Simulation. On , CARM became the official system of record used to assess and collect duties and taxes for commercial goods imported into Canada. Some of its key features are the ability for users to classify and account for their commercial goods, view their transaction history, and make payments. The planning and release of future enhancements to CARM functionality is already well underway.

Since its launch, over 10,700 businesses have registered on the CARM Client Portal, bringing the total number of registered users to over 110,200. These registered businesses represent over 95% of annual transaction volumes.

Transitional measures are in place to support trade chain partners as they adjust to CARM and, specifically, changes to the Release Prior to Payment Program and the usage by importers of their broker's business number. These measures respond to concerns raised by trade chain partners regarding their preparedness and the potential impacts of the release on the flow of goods across the border.

Development funding for the project was first established in 2010 to 2011. As of , $438.4 million has been spent to develop CARM and $118.4 million (inclusive of HST) has been spent to maintain the first five major releases of the solution. Since , Deloitte has been engaged to design, develop, implement, and provide ongoing infrastructure and application management support services for the CARM solution. As of , Deloitte has received $182.2 to develop CARM and $44.2 million for maintenance work on the solution (excluding HST).

Both the Standing Committee on International Trade (CIIT), and the Standing Committee on Government Operations and Estimates (OGGO) have adopted motions for the production of approximately 37,000 pages of CARM material from the CBSA, as well as undertakings for written responses. Packages of material were submitted to OGGO on April 5, July 4, and , and to CIIT on April 4, April 10, May 1, October 7, and . All material has been collected and is in the process of being translated and prepared for disclosure to committees.

Canada-U.S. collaboration

Issue: Leading up to, and now post U.S. election, Canada - U.S. relations have received significant media attention, border security in particular. There is concern over the impacts that will be seen on asylum seekers and refugee claimants, as well as increased tariffs, after the U.S. inauguration.

Key message

The CBSA is Canada's first line of defence at 1,200 ports of entry across the country. Approximately 8,500 frontline personnel play a crucial role protecting our communities by preventing dangerous goods and people from entering Canada. Across the country, the CBSA employs over 200 criminal investigators who investigate individuals and businesses that commit serious offences against Canada's border and criminal legislation. Abroad, the Agency employs approximately 60 international officers at 40 missions in 35 countries who help push our borders out.

The CBSA works closely with domestic and U.S. law enforcement partners to protect our shared border, our communities, and bolster our economies. Every day last year, nearly $3.6 billion worth of goods and services and about 400,000 people crossed the Canada-U.S. border.

In Canada, border security and integrity is a shared mandate between the CBSA and the RCMP. The CBSA is responsible for enforcing the law at designated ports of entry in Canada and the RCMP is responsible between ports of entry.

It is illegal to enter between ports of entry and it is not safe. The Safe Third Country Agreement (STCA) applies to the entire land border. When persons crossing between ports of entry are intercepted by the RCMP or local police, they are brought to a designated port of entry. If an individual does not meet an STCA exception, or is otherwise determined ineligible, they will be removed to the U.S.

The CBSA is closely monitoring border impacts following the U.S. election and is ready to respond should there be greater demand at the border or activities or events that may impact operations.

Depending on the scenario, the CBSA's mitigation plans include additional resources at ports of entry, communications protocols, and collaboration with local law enforcement agencies, emergency medical services, other government departments and U.S. partners.

Criminals try to exploit the Canada-U.S. border both ways, via all modes of transport. U.S. authorities count on Canada in the same way Canada counts on them to share information and identify threats to our countries. It is a tried and tested partnership that has kept our countries safe for decades.

Background

The outcome of the , U.S. election has the potential to directly and indirectly impact Canadian border operations. This includes a possible influx of arrivals as well as possible disruptions on or near the border.

The CBSA has plans in place to sustain operations in the face of potential impacts resulting from the U.S. election and to ensure the health, safety and security of CBSA employees and CBSA infrastructure, property and/or assets.

Canada-US relations

The CBSA works regularly and closely with domestic and U.S. law enforcement partners in a joint effort to manage irregular migration and assist with investigations.

The joint Canada-U.S. cross-border task force ensures that law enforcement partners on both sides of the border leverage benefit from shared intelligence, information, and partnerships, to detect and intercept illegal firearms movements and contraband at the border.

Immigration enforcement and detention

Individuals crossing from the U.S. to Canada between designated ports of entry and who make a refugee claim will be returned to the U.S. unless they qualify for an exception. Likewise, individuals crossing from Canada to the U.S. between designated ports of entry and who make a refugee claim will be returned to Canada unless they qualify for an exception.

The CBSA has a legal obligation to remove all foreign nationals and permanent residents that are inadmissible to Canada under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act.

Our priority remains to remove inadmissible individuals from Canada as soon as possible, with a particular focus on individuals who are inadmissible for reasons involving national security, organized crime, crimes against humanity and criminality.

The Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) and the CBSA are prepared for an increase in illegal migration. Contingency plans are in place to increase the number of agents and vehicles at borders, and to maintain close communication with U.S. border agents.

Intelligence activities are conducted to identify individuals and entities in connection to organized crime activities, drug smuggling, human trafficking and other violations of the Customs Act and the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act.

Over 30 million foreign nationals enter Canada each year and 0.02% are subject to detention. The vast majority of foreign nationals are not subject to any restrictions. As of , 13,818 individuals were enrolled in alternatives to detention, 158 individuals were detained within our immigration holding centres and 34 others within provincial correctional facilities or local police agency holding cells.

The CBSA is committed to exercising its responsibility for detentions to the highest standards, with the well-being of detainees and the safety and security of Canadians as top priorities.

Asylum

The CBSA consistently monitors trends, including the number of asylum claimants who arrive at Canadian ports of entry, or those who arrive between the ports and are apprehended by the RCMP. To date, the CBSA has not observed an increase in asylum claims since the U.S. election.

The CBSA and the RCMP proactively collaborate with local police forces of jurisdiction, U.S. federal counterparts and other non-governmental organizations on the collection and analysis of information. This includes reviewing the validity of the intentions of potential migrants emigrating to Canada through legal channels. These groups are also working to detect and disrupt illegal channels of migration, human smugglers and the criminal networks that support them.

Organized crime

The CBSA places highest priority on removal cases involving national security, organized crime, crimes against humanity and criminals.

The CBSA works closely on an ongoing basis with U.S. law enforcement partners in a joint effort to ensure border security, including intelligence and law enforcement.

Intelligence activities are conducted to identify individuals and entities in connection to organized crime, drug smuggling, human trafficking and other violations of the Customs Act and the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act.

The joint Canada-U.S. cross-border task force ensures law enforcement partners on both sides of the border leverage benefit from shared intelligence, information, and partnerships, to detect and intercept illegal firearms movements and contraband at the border.

In 2023, the CBSA in collaboration with local, national and international partners:

  • prevented over 900 prohibited firearms and over 27,100 weapons (over 10% more weapons than 2022) from entering our country and hurting our communities
  • intercepted over 72,200 kg of prohibited drugs, cannabis, narcotics and chemicals, representing an increase of over 29% from 2022
  • welcomed 86,575,393 travellers (Air: 34,610,650; Highway: 48,045,104, including 5,887,719 truck drivers; Marine: 3,648,946; Rail: 270,693), an increase of nearly 45% compared to 2022; and almost 496,000 international students, an increase of over 25% compared to 2022
  • processed the arrival of over 72,000 asylum seekers, an increase of approximately 10% compared to 2022
  • processed 5,360,208 commercial trucks into Canada
  • assessed over $39.3 billion in duties and taxes (Customs duties, Special Import Measures Act duties, GST and Excise taxes)
  • continued to protect Canadian industry from unfair trade practices by administering the Special Import Measures Act (SIMA), with over $270 million in SIMA duties assessed and approximately 30,000 Canadian jobs protected

In 2024, between January 1st and October 31st, the CBSA in collaboration with local, national and international partners:

  • prevented over 1,274 prohibited firearms and over 15,600 weapons from entering our country and hurting our communities
  • intercepted over 25,600 kg of prohibited drugs, cannabis, narcotics and chemicals
  • welcomed 80,500,000 travellers (Air: 31,800,000; Highway: 45,100,000, Marine: 3,300,000; Rail: 336,000), an increase of nearly 9% compared to 2023; processed the arrival of over 113,000 asylum seekers
  • processed 4,500,000 commercial trucks into Canada
  • assessed over $32.5 billion in duties and taxes (Customs duties, Special Import Measures Act duties, GST and Excise taxes)
  • continued to protect Canadian industry from unfair trade practices by administering the Special Import Measures Act (SIMA), with over $136.4 million in SIMA duties assessed and approximately 30,000 Canadian jobs protected

Detentions

Immigration detention

Key messages

The Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) uses immigration detention as a measure of last resort, and only after alternatives have been considered.

Immigration detention is governed by the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act and the decision to detain is reviewed by the Immigration and Refugee Board (IRB). The IRB is a quasi-judicial and independent tribunal that has the authority to continue a detention or to order the release of an individual.

As a result of decisions by provinces to terminate their long-standing immigration detention agreements, the CBSA is retrofitting its three immigration holding centres and collaborating with Correctional Service Canada to establish an independent, CBSA-operated, designated immigrant station within the confines of a federal penitentiary.

Budget 2024 allocated $325 million over five years for upgrading immigration holding centres to enable secure detention of high-risk individuals, as well as proposed legislative changes, which were approved to allow for the temporary housing of immigration detainees in a Correctional Service Canada facility.

The CBSA has an existing immigration detention agreement with the province of Ontario until . As of , there are 18 high-risk detainees who are being housed in Ontario correctional facilities. These individuals will eventually be removed from Canada, continue to be detained in a provincial facility, or eventually, a CBSA immigration holding centre.

The Agency is taking the necessary steps to manage high-risk detainees in its own facilities, while ensuring the safe release of other individuals into the community. The CBSA is increasing the number of guards and providing additional tools to ensure staff safety, and increasing the use of alternatives to detention.

Background

Canada's immigration detention program is governed by the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA) and its regulations. It is based on the principle that detention shall only be used as a measure of last resort where an individual may present a danger to the public, is a flight risk, or where their identity has not been established. The program is carried out in accordance with fundamental procedural safeguards and detainee rights as guaranteed by the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The CBSA works to ensure that it is exercising its responsibility for detentions to the highest possible standards, with regard to the physical health, mental health, and overall well-being of detainees, as well as the safety and security of Canadians and of employees.

CBSA officers detain foreign nationals and permanent residents when there are reasonable grounds to believe the person is inadmissible to Canada and is:

  • a danger to the public
  • unlikely to appear (flight risk) for immigration processes
  • unable to satisfy the officer of their identity (foreign nationals only)
  • upon entry, to complete an immigration examination; or
  • has been designated as part of an irregular arrival by the Minister of Public Safety (16 years of age or older only)

CBSA officers may also detain foreign nationals and permanent residents at a port of entry where there are reasonable grounds to suspect the individual is inadmissible due to security grounds, human rights violations or criminality.

Detention serves two primary objectives: protecting public safety from individuals who may pose a danger to society; and preserving the integrity of the immigration system by ensuring individuals comply with program requirements.

Detention is a last resort and officers must always consider alternatives to detention. Alternatives to detention may include release on reporting conditions, including performance bonds; cash deposit; establishment of a bondsperson; acceptance into a community case management and supervision program or electronic monitoring.

A CBSA officer's decision to detain a person under the IRPA is subject to review by the Immigration and Refugee Board (IRB), an independent quasi-judicial tribunal. Detainees must appear before the IRB within the first 48 hours of being detained. At a detention review, the IRB may release the person or identify conditions for release or determine that detention should continue. If the IRB determines that detention should be continued, the individual must appear in the next seven days and every 30 days thereafter. The Immigration Division of the IRB always provides reasons for its decisions, and its decisions are subject to judicial review with leave from the Federal Court.

In response to the termination of detention agreements with provincial governments, the CBSA has been pursuing various infrastructure options for holding high-risk immigration detainees. While the physical infrastructure of the Agency's immigration holding centres were never intended to hold high risk detainees, upgrades to these facilities are currently underway that will establish units specifically designed for holding individuals with higher risk profiles. Further, an agreement with Correctional Service Canada to establish an independent, CBSA-operated, designated immigrant station within the confines of a federal penitentiary, will increase high-risk capacity when an identified location is operationalized.

Updated policies, procedures, and training are also being implemented, and increased tools and staffing complements are being introduced, to ensure staff at immigration holding centres are adequately prepared and resourced. These measures will ensure the CBSA is able to continue to detain all individuals subject to enforcement measures under the IRPA, for whom release on an alternative to detention is not an option.

Minors are housed or detained only as a last resort. The CBSA actively and continuously seeks alternatives to detention when unconditional release of parent(s)/legal guardian(s) is not appropriate and it is not the CBSA's practice to separate children from their parent(s) or legal guardian(s). Alternative arrangements for minors may be sought, such as placement under the care of child welfare authorities or family members. Where detention may be considered, the best interest of the child is always a primary consideration. Regulatory amendments concerning the best interest of the child were introduced to ensure greater consistency and to close policy gaps by enshrining in regulation that the best interest of the child must be considered in any decision that would affect a non-detained minor as well as a mandatory list of factors to consider when determining the best interest of the child with respect to detention and release. The vast majority of minors held in an immigration holding centre are not detained, but are housed. A housed minor is free to remain with their parents and can stay or leave the immigration holding centre (subject to consent).

Detention statistics

Since , the CBSA has been posting statistics related to immigration detention online. Published statistics include annual and quarterly statistics from 2012 to 2013 up to 2023 to 2024, and provides details on those detained, including where, for how long, and under what grounds (Refer to Annex A for details).

As of , 13,280 individuals are enrolled in alternatives to detention, 161 are being held in an immigration holding centre, 18 are detained in a provincial correctional facility, and 2 in another type of facility. The following is a percentage breakdown: almost 98% are on an alternatives to detention, 1.5% are in immigration holding centres, and less than 0.5% in a provincial correctional facility.

Annex A: Annual detention statistics from 2012 to 2024

Published statistics include annual and quarterly statistics from 2012 to 2013 up to 2023 to 2024, and provides details on those detained, including where, for how long, and under what grounds.

General Detention Statistics

Table 1.1 Detentions as a percentage of entries, by length of detention and by facility
Fiscal year Entries by foreign nationals to Canada Persons detained (total) Persons in detention / daily average) Detainees as a percentage of entries by foreign nationals to Canada Detention days Average length of detention (days) Median length of detention (days) Detentions in IHCs
(number and percentage)
Detentions in non-IHCs
Detentions in provincial facilities
(number and percentage)
Detentions in other facilities
(number and percentage)
2012 to 2013 27,412,327 8,742 539 0.032% 194,249 22 3 6,128 / 61% 3,070 / 31% 781 / 8%
2013 to 2014 28,371,259 7,720 538 0.027% 194,017 25 3 5,369 / 61% 2,738 / 31% 725 / 8%
2014 to 2015 29,938,646 6,786 497 0.021% 178,498 26 4 4,486 / 57% 2,510 / 32% 828 / 11%
2015 to 2016 31,940,610 6,602 451 0.019% 164,449 25 3 4,385 / 57% 2,361 / 31% 955 / 12%
2016 to 2017 33,873,180 6,268 364 0.023% 130,538 21 3 4,248 / 59% 2,041 / 28% 971 / 13%
2017 to 2018 35,668,185 8,355 333 0.024% 119,712 14 2 6,609 / 71% 1,831 / 20% 831 / 9%
2018 to 2019 36,145,370 8,781 342 0.027% 121,709 14 1 7,212 / 69% 1,679 / 16% 1,622 / 15%
2019 to 2020 33,083,807 8,825 326 0.027% 115,559 14 1 7,064 / 68% 1,932 / 19% 1,359 / 13%
2020 to 2021 2,980,674 1,607 134 0.054% 48,284 30 8 901 / 47% 786 / 40% 245 / 13%
2021 to 2022 7,438,684 3,054 183 0.041% 65,612 22 3 2,254 / 65% 819 / 23% 413 / 12%
2022 to 2023 22,968,934 5,251 237 0.023% 84,258 17 2 4,191 / 72% 930 / 16% 715 / 12%
2023 to 2024 30,712,332 4,929 260 0.016% 93,004 19 3 4,040 /70% 716 /17% 944/13%
Source: CIC DWS - Business Reporting IHDA Datamart

Notes:

  • All statistics related to number of persons detained or the number of detentions include the total number of persons in detention at any time during the reporting period. The number may include individuals whose detention began before the reporting period and/or who were released during (or after) the reporting period
  • The numbers presented in each quarter cannot be added together to equal an annual sum. This is because the quarterly numbers reflect the number of people in detention at a given time, and could include a person who is detained over 2 quarters and carried over. Similarly, changes can take place over the time a person is detained that can lead to double counting in the total number of people in detention by facility type. Individuals can be transferred between facility types, and could therefore be counted in both. Detention days are the number of cumulative days spent in detention for all detainees over the reporting period under the provisions of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act
  • Median length of detention represents the middle value (or the average of two middle values) in days when the numbers are listed in numerical order from smallest to largest
  • IHC refers to "immigration holding center"
  • Detentions in other facilities includes other law enforcement agencies (in other words, Royal Canadian Mounted Police detachments, local and provincial police cells), CBSA ports of entry and inland enforcement cells, as well as other law enforcement agencies' cells that are only used for very short periods of time
Table 1.2 Persons detained by length of detention
Fiscal year 24 hours or less 25 to 48 hours 3 to 9 days 10 to 39 days 40 to 99 days Over 99 days
2012 to 2013 2,631 1,159 2,081 2,138 767 620
2013 to 2014 2,425 918 1,711 1,759 769 631
2014 to 2015 1,994 685 1,632 1,543 688 629
2015 to 2016 1,825 844 1,587 1,498 674 547
2016 to 2017 2,042 891 1,376 1,278 594 427
2017 to 2018 4,085 1,138 1,239 1,233 637 326
2018 to 2019 4,279 1,128 1,421 1,379 621 286
2019 to 2020 4,050 1,101 1,562 1,600 621 241
2020 to 2021 328 144 413 422 259 163
2021 to 2022 1,098 335 601 661 309 188
2022 to 2023 2,337 555 867 1,060 422 204
2023 to 2024 1,889 547 853 1,057 518 245
Table 1.3 Persons sorted detained by province
Province 2012 to 2013 2013 to 2014 2014 to 2015 2015 to 2016 2016 to 2017 2017 to 2018 2018 to 2019 2019 to 2020 2020 to 2021 2021 to 2022 2022 to 2023 2023 to 2024
Alberta 259 292 270 234 160 170 187 226 111 161 166 164
British Columbia 1,663 1,399 1,282 1,482 1,801 2,215 1,818 1,470 310 680 1,061 1,036
Manitoba 133 127 165 62 70 104 61 72 23 23 28 31
New Brunswick 14 11 11 19 18 10 15 28 10 18 20 16
Newfoundland and Labrador 10 4 5 2 1 10 5 10 13 6 6 1
Northwest Territories 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0
Nova Scotia 11 14 10 9 14 12 10 14 14 10 7 7
Ontario 5,380 4,578 3,881 3,533 3,159 4,040 4,755 5,265 872 1,477 2,422 2,418
Prince Edward Island 0 0 2 2 1 4 0 2 1 1 0 1
Quebec 1,270 1,287 1,161 1,246 1,034 1,803 1,949 1,755 252 680 1,656 1,376
Saskatchewan 50 41 35 38 30 14 15 26 18 17 22 25
Yukon 7 5 3 4 3 2 2 0 0 2 1 0
Note: The sum of the provincial data is greater than the total number of detainees due to transfers between provinces.
Table 1.4 Persons detained by grounds for detention
Grounds for detention 2012 to
2013
2013 to
2014
2014 to
2015
2015 to
2016
2016 to
2017
2017 to
2018
2018 to
2019
2019 to
2020
2020 to
2021
2021 to
2022
2022 to
2023
2023 to
2024
Danger to the public 45 31 36 47 47 67 70 65 38 29 33 60
Examination 240 287 214 276 194 777 394 266 31 64 424 159
Identity 488 354 302 334 290 392 439 564 46 116 372 312
Security certificate 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Suspected inadmissibility on grounds of human/international rights violation 4 0 2 1 0 2 4 4 1 1 1 7
Suspected Inadmissibility on grounds of security 10 6 5 5 2 1 8 7 2 2 9 9
Suspected inadmissibility on grounds of serious criminality/ criminality/organized criminality 61 238 187 167 139 122 47 50 13 57 118 101
Unlikely to appear/danger to the public 831 831 512 394 318 368 493 525 250 322 394 428
Unlikely to appear 7,287 6,187 5,668 5,514 5,402 6,737 7,476 7,509 1,288 2,514 3,958 3,928

Notes:

These grounds for detention may apply to a permanent resident or foreign national who may be inadmissible to Canada:

  • Examination (If an officer considers it is necessary to get more information from an individual to complete the examination, that individual could be detained to allow the officer to do so. An examination can be as simple as a few questions, but can also include an examination of the person's personal belongings, more intensive questioning, or personal searches)
  • Suspected of serious criminality, criminality or organized criminality
  • Suspected inadmissibility on grounds of security
  • Suspected inadmissibility on grounds of human/international rights violation
  • Identity (If an officer is unable to verify an individual's identity, that person may be detained)
  • Danger to the public (Factors considered when detaining someone as a danger to the public are outlined in section 246 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations. Factors may include, but are not limited to, past criminality and criminal associations)
  • Unlikely to appear (A person may be detained if an officer believes the person is unlikely to appear for examination, an admissibility hearing, removal from Canada or at a proceeding that could lead to the making of a removal order.)

Removals

Key message

The timely removal of inadmissible foreign nationals plays a critical role in supporting the integrity of Canada's asylum and Immigration system and contributes to the Government of Canada's security and public safety priorities.

The CBSA has a legal obligation under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act to remove any foreign national that does to have the right to stay in Canada, as soon as possible. The CBSA is firmly committed to doing so.

The CBSA prioritizes removals based on a risk management regime:

  • Priority 1: Security, organized crime, crimes against humanity, serious criminality and criminality, and failed irregular arrival refugee claimants
  • Priority 2: Failed refugee claimants
  • Priority 3: All other inadmissible persons

From to , the CBSA removed 16,318 inadmissible foreign nationals from Canada, representing a 59% increase from the 10,232 that took place from to .

From to , 9,509 inadmissible foreign nationals have been removed from Canada, putting the CBSA on track to maintain previous year removal levels.

Over a five and a half year period, from to , a total of 66,656 enforced removals of inadmissible foreign nationals from Canada took place.

Common challenges that prevent the CBSA from removing inadmissible foreign nationals include uncooperative foreign nationals and/or foreign governments. The CBSA participates in international groups such as the M5 Returns Network, established to identify joint strategies and share best practices to achieve timely removals of deemed inadmissible persons.

These efforts are essential to maintain the integrity of Canada's asylum and immigration programs.

Background

As part of its enforcement of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA) the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) has a statutory obligation to remove any foreign national that has been issued a removal order for violating the IRPA. Immigration removal is an integral part of the CBSA's security mandate.

The IRPA specifies that individuals may be inadmissible for any of the following reasons: security; crimes against humanity and war crimes; criminality; organized crime; risk to health of Canadians or excessive demand on health services; misrepresentation; inability to financially support yourself or your dependents; and non-compliance with the IRPA (for example, overstaying the authorized period of stay in Canada, working without authorization, etc.).

Individuals believed to be inadmissible to Canada have a report written against them. The merits of the report are reviewed by another official (Minister's Delegate), who will determine if the evidence supports the inadmissibility allegation and either issue a removal order, if the allegation falls within their authority, or refer the report to an admissibility hearing before the Immigration and Refugee Board (IRB), an independent administrative tribunal. For those who are found inadmissible, a removal order is issued against them. Every foreign national ordered to be removed from Canada is entitled to due process before the law. Removal orders are subject to various levels of appeal. Foreign nationals can also file an application for leave and judicial review before the Federal Court accompanied by a stay motion throughout the removal process. Removal cannot be enforced until all pending legal avenues that can stay a removal have been exhausted.

The CBSA prioritizes removals based on a risk management regime:

  • Priority 1: Security, organized crime, crimes against humanity, serious criminality and criminality, and failed irregular arrival refugee claimants
  • Priority 2: Failed refugee claimants
  • Priority 3: All other inadmissible persons

The existence of a removal order does not automatically mean the CBSA is in a position to immediately remove someone from the country. There are a number of different legal and administrative processes that must be addressed before the CBSA is in a position to undertake a removal. All individuals who are subject to removal have access to due process and procedural fairness. They may seek redress through various processes at the IRB (appeals), as well as the Federal Court of Canada (judicial review). Once individuals have exhausted all legal avenues that stays a removal order, the Agency is mandated to enforce the removal order as soon as possible.

Impediments to removal may exist that prevent the CBSA from enforcing the removal order in a timely manner. Common challenges include uncooperative foreign nationals and/or foreign governments. Foreign nationals may abscond, fail to provide information to establish their true identity, or refuse to provide the documentation needed to obtain the travel document from the Foreign Mission to allow for their removal. Foreign governments may refuse the return of their nationals, or may fail to issue timely travel documents. Other impediments may include, but are not limited to, the inability to use commercial airlines due to their lack of flights to certain destinations, their limits on the number of deportees per flight, or refusal to transport foreign nationals with criminality. The CBSA works closely with foreign governments, Canadian officials abroad and with other departments such as Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada and Global Affairs Canada with respect to obtaining travel documents.

The CBSA also engages in a number of activities including the continued participation in international fora such as the Inter-Governmental Consultations forum for information exchange and policy debate on issues of relevance to the management of international migratory flows and the M5 Returns Network established to identify joint strategies and share best practices to achieve timely removals of deemed inadmissible persons.

In response to the significant increase in individuals making asylum claims in Canada, the CBSA aligned its resources to enforce removal orders in a more efficient and timely manner. To address the inventory growth, the number of removals have increased each year since emerging from the pandemic and overall removals of inadmissible foreign nationals in Canada have increased by approximately 116% this fiscal year when compared to fiscal year 2021 to 2022, and 59% from the 10,232 removed in 2022 to 2023.

The implementation of the Additional Protocol to the Safe Third Country Agreement (STCA) has also contributed to an increase in port of entry removals as follows:

  • Before , asylum seekers entering Canada from the United States between ports of entry and intercepted by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police were brought to the nearest CBSA office to be processed and make an asylum claim. An officer would determine whether or not the person was admissible to enter Canada or remain in Canada, and if the asylum claim was found eligible the claimant's file was referred to IRB for a decision. Prior to the Additional Protocol, the STCA did not apply to asylum claimants who crossed into Canada between ports of entry. Therefore these asylum claimants were not returned to the U.S
  • Since , the Additional Protocol which expanded the STCA across the entire land border, including internal waterways, has been a primary driver for the increase in port of entry removals. Now, if a person enters Canada to make an asylum claim at a land border crossing or between ports of entry and does not meet one of the Agreement's exceptions, or is otherwise determined ineligible, they will removed

As of , the CBSA has successfully removed 9,509 foreign nationals in 2024 to 2025, and is on track to maintain 2023 to 2024 levels. These efforts are essential in maintaining the integrity of Canada's asylum system.

Removals from Canada
Enforced removals Priority 1 Priority 1 Priority 2 Priority 3 Total
Serious inadmissibility Irregular migrant failed refugee claimant Failed refugee claimants Other inadmissibilities
2019 to 2020 1,025 552 6,331 3,676 11,584
2020 to 2021 486 219 9,535 1,020 11,260
2021 to 2022 563 262 5,168 1,534 7,527
2022 to 2023 642 633 7,000 1,956 10,231
2023 to 2024 731 1,817 11,475 2,297 16,320
2024 to 2025 527 874 6,830 1,503 9,734
Total 3,974 4,357 46,339 11,986 66,656

As of

Removal inventory
Sub inventories Descriptions Totals
No Action Required The No Action Required inventory includes individuals that fall outside of the enforcement stream. These include, but are not limited to, pending refugee determination and convention refugees. 390,702
Paused The Paused inventory includes individuals that cannot currently be removed. These include, but are not limited to, pending Federal Court appeals, criminal charges, or Pre-Removal Risk Assessments, and serving a sentence of imprisonment. 20,958
Wanted The Wanted inventory includes individuals who failed to appear for removal proceedings and the CBSA is working to locate. 29,955
Working The Working inventory includes individuals who can be processed for removal. At this stage, the CBSA starts working with the individual and foreign countries to resolve challenges and obtain the necessary travel documents to facilitate the removal. 28,643
Total   470,258

As of
The enforcement continuum is not linear and individuals may move in and out of these inventories at any given time.

Human smuggling

Key messages

The CBSA works with partners including the RCMP, IRCC, U.S. Homeland Security Investigations, U.S. Coast Guard, and U.S. Customs and Border Protection to disrupt human smuggling networks and combat international criminal organizations that seek to profit from the desperation and vulnerability of others.

Human smuggling is a form of illegal migration that involves the organized transport of a person across an international border, usually in exchange for money and in dangerous conditions.

The CBSA has primary responsibility for investigating most offences under s. 117 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA), including human smuggling (organizing entry into Canada) when it occurs through ports of entry (POE).

The RCMP has primary jurisdiction for investigating human trafficking (trafficking in persons) under s. 118 of the IRPA and for patrolling between official POEs.

If the CBSA sees evidence of human trafficking during its investigations, the Agency will refer the case to the RCMP.

There are instances where the CBSA will take the lead on cases involving suspected human trafficking, particularly in relation to labour trafficking and where there are other suspected IRPA offences that fall within the CBSA's area of expertise.

Between , and , the CBSA opened 586 criminal investigations involving suspected human smuggling. Within the same period, the CBSA laid charges in 197 cases involving suspected human smuggling. Charges were laid under s. 117 of the IRPA (organizing entry into Canada) in 16 of these cases. Of these 16 cases, 13 are now closed, with convictions in 12 of them.

Background

Human smuggling is a form of illegal migration that involves the organized transport of a person across an international border, usually in exchange for a sum of money and sometimes in dangerous conditions. In such cases, when the final destination is reached, the business relationship ends, and the smuggler and the individual part company. A person who has agreed to be smuggled into the country, however, may also become a victim of human trafficking at the hands of the smuggler.

Investigations under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA) are divided between the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP). The CBSA Criminal Investigations Program (CIP) has primary responsibility for investigating the bulk of the offences under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA), including human smuggling (organizing entry into Canada) under s. 117. The RCMP has primary jurisdiction for investigating human trafficking (trafficking in persons) offences under s. 118. If the CBSA sees evidence of human trafficking during its investigations, the CIP will refer the case to the RCMP. However, there are instances where the CBSA will take the lead on cases involving suspected human trafficking, particularly in relation to labour trafficking and where there are other suspected IRPA offences that fall within the CBSA's area of expertise.

On , Canada and the United States (U.S.) announced the expansion of the application of the Safe Third Country Agreement with the implementation of the Additional Protocol (AP) to account for the entirety of the land border, including internal waterways, to ensure fair and more orderly migration between Canada and the U.S. Under the expanded Agreement. Since the coming into force of the AP, the number of irregular migrants interceptions by the RCMP has decreased leading to the closing of the RCMP facilities at Roxham Road in .

The southbound movement, characterized by irregular migrants exploiting Canada as a transit country for illegal entry to the U.S. between their designated ports of entry, has increased by approximately 200% over the 2023 U.S. fiscal year. There have been 21,422 southbound apprehensions (SBA) reported by the U.S. Customs and Border Protection, from to (U.S. fiscal year). The majority of this movement is almost certainly facilitated by human smuggling groups.

Since , and moving into the fall, SBAs began to decline significantly. Prior to that, between and , SBA reports were elevated but the monthly average remained relatively stable at approximately 1,173 per month. In , there was a sharp increase in reported apprehensions, nearly tripling the aforementioned average. Reported SBAs peaked in , with a record 3,347 encounters. The recent decrease is almost certainly due to a combination of factors such as enforcement efforts, political landscapes shifting in both Canada and the U.S., as well as a significant decrease in the movement of Indian nationals.

Investigating human smuggling networks poses challenges for law enforcement, as smuggling groups may have loose affiliations, operate in various transit countries, or have minimal contact with irregular migrants. In addition, investigators face barriers accessing evidence or witnesses due to the complex nature of human smuggling. Joint investigations and timely information sharing amongst law enforcement partners is key for identifying and dismantling these networks.

The CBSA is an active participant in a number of initiatives and fora with the aim to combat human smuggling. The Cross-Border Law Enforcement Advisory Committee fosters collaboration between the RCMP, the CBSA, Homeland Security Investigations, U.S. Coast Guard, and U.S. Customs and Border Protection on border-security issues, including human smuggling and irregular migration. The Integrated Border Enforcement Teams are bilateral multi-agency law enforcement teams that target cross-border illegal activity. The operational approach focuses on mutual information-sharing in order to stay one step ahead of criminals.

In addition, Cross-border Maritime Law Enforcement Operations, also known as Shiprider, consist of vessels jointly crewed by specially trained and designated Canadian (CBSA, RCMP, and Coast Guard) and U.S. law enforcement officers. The approach, the first of its kind, allows for a seamless continuity in maritime enforcement of Canada and U.S. laws by authorizing officials to operate on either side of the border, without violating the sovereignty of each country. Shiprider continues to serve as one the most successful examples of Canada-U.S. integrated cross-border operations.

Stats

Between and , the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) opened 586 criminal investigations involving suspected human smuggling. Within the same period, the CBSA laid charges in 197 cases involving suspected human smuggling. Charges were laid under s 117 of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA) (organizing entry into Canada) in 16 of these. Of these 16 cases, 13 are now closed, with convictions in 12 of them. In the other cases, a variety of IRPA charges would have been laid depending on the evidence gathered through investigation (for example, counselling misrepresentation or misrepresentation, as a result of fraudulent documents or statements made during immigration applications).

Port labour stoppages (Montreal and Vancouver)

Issue: Impacts to the Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) operations as a result of the labour disruptions occurring at the Port of Montreal and in British Columbia (Vancouver/Fraser Port Authority and Port of Prince Rupert).

Key message

At international marine terminals, the CBSA is responsible for assessing risk of containers, while facilitating the movement of legitimate conveyances to maintain fluidity in the supply chain.

Once the Canada Industrial Relations Board (CIRB) directed the cessation of labour action at British Columbia and Montreal, the CBSA began supporting the recovery of operations in the supply chain, with an emphasis on clearing backlogs.

The CBSA is working closely with trade chain partners to prioritize the inspection of high risk goods at the first point of arrival while ensuring that presentation of containers and goods for examination is done in a timely manner.

At the time of the strike, the Agency prepared for an increased influx of containers in the Atlantic region as vessels were diverted from Montreal.

The CBSA engages internally across the country to ensure sufficient space in all warehouses where examinations are conducted so we are prepared for an influx of goods when business resumes.

The CBSA works with other government departments to ensure that examinations are conducted efficiently and all requirements are respected.

Background

In , labour disruptions commenced at some of Canada's major marine ports of entry (POEs), including the Port of Montreal, the Port of Vancouver, and the Port of Prince Rupert. The labour disruptions involved unions representing longshoremen at the ports, including those represented by the Canadian Union of Public Employees (CUPE) at the Port of Montreal, and those represented by the International Longshore and Warehouse Union (ILWU) Local 514 on the West Coast of Canada. As longshoremen are involved in a number of key activities at marine ports, including bringing vessels alongside docks, tying and untying, as well as all loading, unloading activities, any labour disruption impacting their activities effectively halts the movement of marine cargo along the supply chain.

The labour disruptions impacted the movement of containers at the port, including those identified for examination. This resulted in a backlog of containers to be presented to CBSA operations for de-stuffing and inspection activities, as well as presentation of containers to Container Examination Facilities (CEFs) for examination; such backlogs have the potential to create congestion along the supply chain which is factored into recovery operations following the conclusion of the labour disruptions. To assist in mitigating and clearing such backlogs, the CBSA worked closely with terminal operators, including those operating CEFs, supply chain partners, our National Targeting Centre (NTC), and CBSA operations at other ports of entry to process vessel diversion requests to non-impacted POEs during the disruptions, and subsequently facilitate and prioritize exam targets upon the resumption of work. Of note, CBSA operations at the Ports of Halifax and Saint-John supported the processing of vessels diverted from the Port of Montreal as a result of the labour disruption.

Following the direction issued by the Canada Industrial Relations Board (CIRB) on , and , to cease labour action and resume operations at the ports in British Columbia and Montreal, respectively, the CBSA began supporting the recovery of operations in the supply chain, with an emphasis on clearing backlogs in examinations and de-stuff queues.

The CBSA will rely on the experience and best practices derived from previous labour disruptions in the supply chain, including those recently experienced on the West Coast in 2023, and the Sea Container Crisis Mitigation Strategy in the summer 2022. Some of these best practises include; engaging CBSA operations in Toronto and Montreal to ensure sufficient CBSA capacity in sufferance warehouses to manage a large influx of commercial compliance examinations and releases in a short period of time. Additionally, the Agency engages regularly with our federal partners and trade chain partners (TCP) to ensure the prioritization of high-risk exams including the movement and presentation of goods for inspection in consideration of priorities such as first-in first-out and perishables.

Furthermore, the CBSA keeps TCPs apprised of their reporting and operational requirements as the movement of goods recovers from the disruption. The CBSA uses existing forums such as Border Commercial Consultative Committee and Agency communications products to keep TCPs up to date on any and all developments. In addition, the Agency participates in daily supply chain calls with industry partners and OGDs to ensure that any points of friction are addressed rapidly reducing the potential for downstream impacts.

CBSA staffing numbers

Key message

The CBSA has more than 8,500 frontline employees who work across the country and around the world to keep our border safe.

The CBSA undertakes rigorous planning to ensure that it deploys sufficient frontline officers who are trained and equipped to stop dangerous weapons, drugs and people from entering our communities.

Since 2020, the number of active frontline employees has grown by 4% (from 7,926 to 8,254) in response to increased pressures at our borders and beyond.

Background

The more than 8,500 frontline employees include both employees and middle managers in the FB classification and Student Border Services Officers (SBSO) that actively serve on the frontline:

  • The Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) defines frontline employees within the FB classification and SBSOs with any public facing duties, or in direct support of frontline operations within Travellers, Commercial & Trade and Intelligence & Enforcement Branches
  • The CBSA defines middle managers as any supervisory, or people management position below Executive (EX) ranks. This could include supervisors, superintendents, managers, and chiefs

Agency growth outside of the frontline workforce since 2015, directly or indirectly supports the frontlines in areas of work such as enforcement, trade, policy, information and technology and other enabling program areas.

The CBSA has made investments to increase the number of officers who support Asylum processing and intelligence activities across Canada. This is consistent with investments made by the Government to address pressures in the immigration system.

The number of Border Services Officer graduates from the Canada Border Services College has continuously increased year over year since 2016, with the exception of 2020 due to the College temporarily having to shut down (and moved to online learning for a short period) because of the COVID-19 pandemic.

The CBSA College continues to undertake the necessary planning, recruitment, and training readiness to invite 576 new recruits into the College each year (aimed to produce 490 deployable recruits).

In fiscal year 2024 to 2025, the CBSA forecasted to reach its maximum throughput at the CBSA College and to-date, the Agency is trending to meet this target.

The Agency loses on average 365 Border Services Officers each year; 145 leave mostly due to retirements, and 220 from internal movement to the Intelligence and Enforcement, Commercial and Trade Stream, Travellers and/or other areas within the Agency. The CBSA College accounts for this attrition in its annual planning exercise by inviting close to 576 new recruits into the College each year, ensuring that the workforce remains stable, while also supplementing capacity for major projects and initiatives like Asylum.

The CBSA is an active employer hiring on average over 1000 students annually across all provinces. Most are to support frontline operations under the Student Border Services Officer Program (SBSO), however, students are also hired to support frontline operations, including areas such as information technology, human resources, finance and policy. Each year since 2020, the CBSA has hired on average 700 Student Border Services Officers to complement operations at busy ports of entry across the country.

SBSOs are a pipeline for future Border Services Officers, and are critical in providing current officers opportunities for movement and leave.

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