Background: Standing Committee on Public Safety and National Security—Study on the Review of the Foiled Terrorist Plot in Toronto and of the Security Screening Process (September 19, 2024)

Stats 2023 Year in review

The Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) provides services at 1,200 points across Canada and at 39 international locations.

This section outlines CBSA national statistics for the period between January 1 and October 31, 2023.

Travellers

• 73,669,527 travellers:
  • Air: 29,180,199
  • Highway: 40,837,382
    • including 4,911,934 truck drivers
  • Marine: 3,403,698
  • Rail: 248,248
• 27,060,252 travellers used Primary inspection kiosks
• 85 additional primary inspection kiosks across Canada
• 1.74 million NEXUS members

Commercial goods

• 19.9 million releases^{Footnote 1} of goods into the commerce of Canada following a decision by a Border Services Officer
• 107.7 million courier shipments (only up to September 30, 2023)
• $211.5 billion Trusted Trader value for duty imported^{Footnote 2}
• $32.7 billion total duties and taxes assessed (customs duties, Special Import Measures Act [SIMA] duties, surtaxes, GST and excise taxes)
• Commercial by the numbers:
  • Highway: 4,554,280 trucks
  • Air: 2,718,460 shipments
  • Marine: 1,472,880 containers
  • Rail: 1,532,195 cars

Food, plant and animal

1,613 Agriculture and Agri-Food Administrative Monetary Penalties (AAAMP) issued for food, plant and animal import violations totaling $1,301,600 in penalties.

Enforcement

57,981 seizures^{Footnote 3}, including:

• 589 seizures for a total of 810 firearms seized
• 13,255 seizures for a total of 21,923 weapons seized
• 8,212 illegal drugs seizures
  • Cocaine (including coca leaves, coca paste, cocaine and cocaine crack): 1,475 kilograms
  • Heroin: 88 kilograms
  • Fentanyl: 0.56 kilograms
  • Other opioids (including opium, methadone, morphine and morphine base): 2,701 kilograms
  • Other drugs, narcotics and chemicals: 46,451 kilograms
• 27,407 cannabis seizures totaling 10,068 kilograms
• 1,549 tobacco seizures totaling 662,722 kilograms
• 35 child pornography seizures

Firearms (details)

• Total firearms seized: 810
• Total firearms seizures: 589

Weapons (details)

• Total weapons seized: 21,923
• Total weapon seizures: 13,255

No boards vs. Off-boards

Table 2 (Breakdown of LO-intervened off-boards)

Notes:

1. electronic no boards are from the NTC
2. LO-intervened off-boards and table 2 are from Int'l Operations / International Network, captured in the Weekly Operational Report

Alternatives to Detention (ATDs) statistics

• We do not track ATDs in this way. Stats are only available on individuals who are admitted into either program
• Inbound arrivals with concerns or proof of inadmissibility may be issued an Allowed to leave by the POE or issued a A44 report for review by an MD
  • The finding of an inadmissibility does not automatically lead to being placed on an ATD
  • The data below provides a view of the number of Allowed to leaves and Serious inadmissibility Reports issued in 2023 and the first 6 months of 2024

CBSA Departmental results report: Fact sheet

Key achievements:

• Supported the National Summit on Combatting Auto Theft held in February 2024 and participated in Joint Intelligence Groups with law enforcement partners, leading to increased intelligence capacity and the development of new tools to combat auto theft
• Advanced the Gordie Howe International Bridge Project and the Land Border Crossing Project as part of ongoing efforts to strengthen border infrastructure
• Continued to implement the Agency's Indigenous Framework and Strategy to guide reconciliation efforts with Indigenous Peoples
• Continued to support immigration measures for those affected by the Russian invasion of Ukraine, while working with federal partners to enforce sanctions in response to the Russian invasion and commission of human rights violations
• Supported the designation of the Iranian regime pursuant to subparagraph 35(1)(b) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act through enforcement measures to identify and interdict senior officials who are inadmissible to Canada. Under this designation, 14 immigration enforcement investigations have concluded with a decision to refer the case to an admissibility hearing, for which the CBSA has already asked the Immigration and Refugee Board to schedule an admissibility hearing in seven cases. While five of those cases are ongoing, a removal order has been issued against two individuals, with one removal already enforced
• Supported the designation of the Iranian regime pursuant to subparagraph 35(1)(b) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act through enforcement measures to identify and interdict senior officials who are inadmissible to Canada. Under this designation, 14 immigration enforcement investigations have concluded with a decision to refer the case to an admissibility hearing, for which the CBSA has already asked the Immigration and Refugee Board to schedule an admissibility hearing in seven cases. While five of those cases are ongoing, a removal order has been issued against two individuals, with one removal already enforced
• Combatted human trafficking and fraudulent immigration consultants using intelligence and enforcement capabilities to identify vulnerable persons and leads for criminal investigations. These efforts supported the prosecution of multiple criminal cases in 2023 to 2024, with convictions secured in eight cases involving human smuggling and 11 cases involving fraudulent immigration consultants
• Worked with Employment and Social Development Canada to identify and interdict goods that may have been produced by forced labour. Since the import ban on such goods has been in place, the CBSA has gained experience in applying this measure. Approximately 50 shipments have been intercepted and assessed by the CBSA up to September 2024
• Advanced the CBSA Assessment and Revenue Management (CARM) project through substantial work in 2023 to 2024 to ensure readiness for the internal launch of CARM Release 2 that was delivered in the first quarter of 2024 to 2025
• Supporting the introduction of Bill C-355, An Act to prohibit the export by air of horses for slaughter and to make related amendments to certain Acts, in September 2023

Data sheet: Immigration national security screening

Pre-arrival:

CBSA's Centre for immigration national security screening

Not all asylum claims received by IRCC and CBSA are sent/received for security screening. Certain asylum claimants are exempt from security screening such as minor children (unless a security concern is present) and those who were ineligible to make the claim and left Canada immediately.

CINSS volumes for TR/PR/Front end security screening

CBSA Pre arrival interventions:

The CBSA leverages Advanced Interactive Passenger Information to maintain the integrity of the immigration process and minimize irregular arrivals. The CBSA issues no-board messages to airlines risk was identified in relation to fraud and inadmissibility concerns in broken down as follows.

CBSA Enforcement:

The CBSA refuses entry to Foreign Nationals who are inadmissible and depart directly, issued a removal order and/or are referred to the IRB for a inadmissibility hearing.

Investigations

Detentions/ADT

Hearings

Removals

Border Watch Line

In fiscal year 2023 to 2024, 33,490 tips were received via the Border Watch Line broken down as follows:

• Phone = 10,983
• Fax = 252
• Email = 448
• Mail = 257
• Webform = 21,550
• Total = 33,490

FTE Counts for related functions:

• Security Screening (CINSS): 183
• National Targeting Centre: 316
• Inland Investigations and Removals: 760
• Hearings: 323

Appendix: Countries by document required status

Media scan: Security screening

1. Search: Canada immigration security screening

   Result: Afghan immigration applicant says he's getting mixed signals from Canada on security screening
   Article Title: Afghan immigration applicant says he's getting mixed signals from Canada on security screening
   Summary: The article discusses the delays in the immigration process due to security screening. It focuses on one applicant from Afghanistan who is staying in poor conditions in Pakistan. While there is no specific mention of the CBSA, the article mentions that IRCC's security partners cooperate on the screening

2. Search: Canada immigration security screening

   Result: Chinese students frustrated by lengthy security checks as school year nears
   Article Title: Chinese students frustrated by lengthy security checks as school year nears
   Summary: The article discusses how the CBSA's security screening process has caused delays for a student from China. It mentions that applicants feel that the process is unfair and too long, and a lawyer says that the process is becoming too impacted by geopolitical relations

3. Search: Canada immigration security screening

   Result: Ottawa allowed in half of foreign nationals red-flagged as security risks, audit finds
   Article Title: Ottawa allowed in half of foreign nationals red-flagged as security risks, audit finds
   Summary: The article covers the findings of a CBSA internal audit which found that 46% of non-favourable and inconclusive recommendations from CINSS were overridden by IRCC and resulted in the applicants being admitted to Canada. The article mentions concerns within CBSA regarding the integrity of the program

4. Search: CBSA immigration screening terrorism

   Result: Ottawa reviewing security screening timeline in case of terror plot suspects, minister says
   Article Title: Ottawa reviewing security screening timeline in case of terror plot suspects, minister says
   Summary: The article references the two individuals who were involved in the Toronto terror plot and the concerns with CBSA immigration screening that allowed them to enter

5. Search: Security screening gaza

   Result: Why is Canada asking Palestinians to list scars on Gaza visa applications?
   Article Title: Why is Canada asking Palestinians to list scars on Gaza visa applications?
   Summary: This article does not explicitly mention CBSA, but there are references to security screening. The article mentions the invasive questions people in Gaza are being asked and criticizes the treatment of Palestinians compared to Ukrainians

6. Search: N/A

   Result: Winnipeg man was member of Chinese military branch behind cyber attacks on Canada, officials allege
   Article Title: Winnipeg man was member of Chinese military branch behind cyber attacks on Canada, officials allege
   Summary: The article discusses a man from China who was granted permanent residence in Canada despite being a member of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) and working at the military academy of cyber warfare in China. The article suggests that his presence in Canada raises questions about the effectiveness of Ottawa's screening program

7. Search: N/A

   Result: Canada expels Iran's former deputy interior minister
   Article Title: Canada expels Iran's former deputy interior minister
   Summary: The article references the IRB's decision to order the deportation of a former Iranian official. Security screening is not explicitly mentioned, but the article mentions that the CBSA has written 33 inadmissibility reports for national security in 2024, but only one individual has been removed from Canada

8. Search: N/A

   Result: Person of 'national security concern' was accidentally granted permanent residency
   Article Title: Person of 'national security concern' was accidentally granted permanent residency
   Summary: The article discusses how a person of "national security concern" was granted permanent residency "due to a series of failures" by the CBSA and immigration department. No names are provided in the article

9. Search: N/A

   Result: Internal government audit finds 'gaps' in security screening of Syrian refugees
   Article Title: Internal government audit finds 'gaps' in security screening of Syrian refugees
   Summary: The article discusses gaps in the security screening of Syrian refugees which reportedly led to dozens being admitted to Canada without proper vetting. A CBSA audit found that changes to screening procedures for Operation Syrian Refugee introduced some gaps in the security screening process

10. Search: N/A

    Result: Scientist accused of developing Syria's chemical weapons program traced to Edmonton
    Article Title: Scientist accused of developing Syria's chemical weapons program traced to Edmonton
    Summary: The article discusses how CBSA and CSIS conducted security screening on a Syrian national now residing in Edmonton. According to the article, the Syrian national was a scientist in Syria who developed their chemical weapons program

11. Search: N/A

    Result: Canada has a secret program that grants visas to war criminals, terrorists, security threats
    Article Title: Canada has a secret program that grants visas to war criminals, terrorists, security threats
    Summary: The article discusses how the Government of Canada has a program that allows certain high profile foreign nationals who would otherwise be barred from entering the country due to national security concerns, war crimes, human rights violations and organized crime to be granted special "public policy" entry visas so long as it is in Canada's "national interest."

12. Search: Canada security risk visa

    Result: Court decision barring Chinese student sends message about espionage risk, experts say
    Article Title: Court decision barring Chinese student sends message about espionage risk, experts say
    Summary: The article discusses a student from China who was denied a visa to pursue a Ph.D. in Canada due to concerns that he would spy on behalf of Beijing. There is no explicit mention of the CBSA but the inadmissibility relates to espionage and, therefore, s.34(1)(a) of IRPA

13. Search: N/A

    Result: Trudeau Liberals shrugged for years as foreign interference multiplied
    Article Title: Trudeau Liberals shrugged for years as foreign interference multiplied
    Summary: The article discusses Prime Minister Trudeau's accusations of Indian Government involvement in the killing of Harjit Singh Nijjar. The article discusses the possibility that questions will continue to arise surrounding how the government decides to let individuals into Canada

14. Search: N/A

    Result: Key takeaways from newly released Winnipeg lab documents
    Article Title: Key takeaways from newly released Winnipeg lab documents
    Summary: The article mentions two Chinese scientists who were investigated and dismissed from their positions due to espionage concerns. CBSA is not mentioned, but the article highlights CSIS intelligence and "Canadian Eyes Only" security assessments

15. Search: N/A

    Result: Strict vetting pledged for visas (accessible on the Government of Canada network only)
    Article Title: Strict vetting pledged for visas
    Summary: The article discusses the multi-stage security screening process for Palestinians from Gaza applying to a temporary visa program. The article also highlights concerns from a group of immigration lawyers regarding security risks, given that Hamas – a terrorist group – controls Gaza

16. Search: N/A

    Result: Ottawa launches visa program for Palestinians with ties to Canada (accessible on the Government of Canada network only)
    Article Title: Ottawa launches visa program for Palestinians with ties to Canada
    Summary: The article discusses the temporary immigration program, launched by the Government of Canada, for Palestinians with ties to Canada. The article references additional security screening measures that would be in place for family members who are able to travel to Egypt

17. Search: N/A

    Result: Espionage, terrorism, plotting against governments? Numbers offer a glimpse of Canada's security screening - and its problems (accessible on the Government of Canada network only)
    Article Title: Espionage, terrorism, plotting against governments? Numbers offer a glimpse of Canada's security screening - and its problems
    Summary: The article highlights the small fraction of deportations carried out for foreign nationals with alleged involvement in espionage, in terrorism or in bringing down a government. While the title references security screening, the article rather focuses on inland processes

18. Search: N/A

    Result: 'Wild West': Amid foreign meddling headlines, lawyers fear unfair immigration rulings (accessible on the Government of Canada network only)
    Article Title: 'Wild West': Amid foreign meddling headlines, lawyers fear unfair immigration rulings
    Summary: The article discusses concerns surrounding immigration rulings that are based on security screening findings that are not disclosed to applicants

Operation Syrian Refugee Screening Process

Process flow

1. Prior to referral of cases for comprehensive security screening, IRCC visa officers conducted interviews with applicants to validate their information.^{Footnote 4}
2. 100% of cases falling under Operation Syrian Refugee (OSR) were submitted by IRCC for comprehensive security screening by CBSA and CSIS. The discretionary security screening indicator model was not used.^{Figure note 4}
3. CBSA reviewed applications to understand the background of the applicant (for example, employment information, travel history) and to assess the likelihood that the applicant may be inadmissible to Canada.^{Figure note 5}
4. CBSA reviewed its internal intelligence and enforcement databases and employed all of the following tools: in depth open source checks (for example, media and social media presence), consultation with classified intelligence databases, and consultation with foreign partners.^{Figure note 5}
5. CBSA determined whether the file could be closed favourable or whether inadmissibility concerns (in other words, national security, human or international rights violations and / or organized criminality) existed.^{Figure note 5}
6. Where inadmissibility concerns existed, the CBSA completed additional in-depth checks and analysis.^{Figure note 6}
7. In parallel to CBSA's review, CSIS also reviewed all files. The CBSA is not in a position to provide information regarding CSIS' procedures.^{Figure note 5}
8. Based on CSIS and CBSA findings, CBSA provided a final security screening recommendations to support a decision by IRCC. Inadmissibility recommendation had to meet the legal threshold of reasonable grounds to believe.^{Figure note 5}
9. IRCC made the final decision on visa issuance.^{Figure note 5}

OSR Data points

• The Canada Border Services Agency's security screening program concluded 40,837 case referrals for Syrian nationals in the permanent resident overseas refugee class between December 15, 2015 and March 31, 2020
• 38,420 (94.1%) were closed favourable
• The balance were closed with concerns related to security or insufficient information (non-favourable, inconclusive with observations, favourable with observations)

SECU meeting summary #1 (August 28, 2024)

Date: Wednesday, August 28, 2024
Report prepared by: Nathalie Boutros, Acting Senior Advisor, Parliamentary Affairs, Public Safety Canada

Witnesses

Panel 1: 10:00 am to 11:00 am

Hon. Dominic LeBlanc, P.C., M.P., Minister of Public Safety, Democratic Institutions and Intergovernmental Affairs

• Canada Border Services Agency
  Ted Gallivan, Acting Executive President (on behalf of the President)
• Canadian Security Intelligence Service
  Vanessa Lloyd, Interim Director
• Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness
  Shawn Tupper, Deputy Minister
• Royal Canadian Mounted Police
  Bryan Larkin, Deputy Commissioner, Specialized Policing Services

Panel 2: 11:00 am to 12:00 pm

• Canada Border Services Agency
  Ted Gallivan, Acting Executive President (on behalf of the President)
• Canadian Security Intelligence Service
  Vanessa Lloyd, Interim Director
• Department of Citizenship and Immigration
  Harpreet S Kochhar, Deputy Minister
• Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness
  Shawn Tupper, Deputy Minister
• Royal Canadian Mounted Police
  Bryan Larkin, Deputy Commissioner, Specialized Policing Services

Highlights

The unedited transcript will be provided once available.

In his opening remarks, Minister LeBlanc talked about the security screening process and how it remains the first line of defence against threat actors who are seeking to enter or obtain status in Canada. He explained the role of IRCC, the CBSA and CSIS and the use of tested techniques and methodologies. He also discussed the process before a person travels to Canada, at the border; and once in Canada.

He concluded by saying that the government of Canada will continue to support the work of its security and law enforcement partners to continue their work to prevent, detect, disrupt and respond to any suspected terrorist threats and activities.

CPC asked about the delay in providing the chronology to the committee and the apparent failure in security screening. Members emphasized the need for answers on how the individual flew under the radar for six years despite security checks and biometric data. They also expressed concerns about foreign governments having more intelligence that Canadian agencies.

They also questioned the effectiveness of the security screening. Specifically that it was a foreign intelligence service that shared the information to prevent a mass casualty event.

LPC members focused their questions on the normal security screening processes and the thoroughness of the in-depth security screening. The also asked about the importance of continuous improvement in security screening and the ongoing review of the case.

The BQ asked about the chronology of events as well as the screening process. The member asked about the timeline of CSIS's awareness of the threat and the role of foreign intelligence.

The NDP asked if the government is committed to learning from the case and making necessary adjustments to security screening. The member also asked about the expected timelines for internal investigations and any changes to prevent similar incidents in the future.

During the second panel, CPC members questioning touched on when the initial contact was when the person submitted his application for a temporary resident visitor visa in 2017.

LPC members asked questions about the number of individuals rejected entry into Canada and the reasons for the rejections. They also inquired about the role of biometric information in protecting Canadian borders and serving as the foundation of identity management.

They asked about the training and tools for immigration officers conducting inadmissibility assessments.

The BQ questioned witnesses if security screening is only done when an immigration officer believes it would be useful to carry out one or if there are any risk indicators. The member asked if there is anything to be done to avoid such situation and to improve the effectiveness of the screening process.

The NDP asked witnesses the recent changes that Parliament enacted through Bill C-70. The member also had questions about the risk indicators under the immigration screening program.

The meeting was adjourned at 12:03 pm

Possible follow-ups

N/A

Next steps

The committee will continue the discussion of this study at 12:30 pm on August 28.

SECU meeting summary #2 (August 28, 2024)

Date: Wednesday, August 28, 2024
Report prepared by: Joseph Kofsky, Senior Parliamentary Advisor, Parliamentary Affairs, Canada Border Services Agency

Witnesses

12:35 pm to 2:22 pm

• Canada Border Services Agency
  Aaron McCrorie, Vice-President, Intelligence and Enforcement
• Canadian Security Intelligence Service
  Vanessa Lloyd, Interim Director
• Department of Citizenship and Immigration
  Pemi Gill, Assistant Deputy Minister
  Aiesha Zafar, Assistant Deputy Minister, Migration Integrity
• Royal Canadian Mounted Police
  Jennifer Gates-Flaherty, Director General, Canadian Criminal Real Time Identification Services

Highlights

The unedited transcript will be provided once available.

CPC members spoke to concerns about the absence of information for six years after the accused's entry into Canada and how Canadians can be certain there are sufficient checks in place to best ensure there are no gaps in the immigration screening process. Members also referenced the 2015 video and six security checks the accused underwent and asked if there was an identifiable failure in the screening process. Additionally, members inquired if legislative amendments could be identified to enhance the security screening process.

The CPC emphasized the CBSA's duty to ensure those posing a national security threat do not have access to gain entry into Canada and inquired about the nature of the security checks that were conducted. Additionally, members asked how the accused obtained status and citizenship when risks had been identified. Moreover, members inquired about removal statistics (those removed vs. those pending removal) and asked what steps are being taken to ensure falsified records are being identified.

The CPC stated the GoC was delayed in detecting the threat and questioned the effectiveness of GoC screening processes; members emphasized a need to identify and rectify screening issues moving forward. A National Post report was cited in support of this assertion, in which American authorities allegedly announced the apprehension of 233 terrorist suspects seeking admission into the United States from Canada.

In response, VP Aaron McCrorie spoke to the comprehensive and layered screening processes in place and emphasized that a review / investigation is currently underway to identify possible improvements that can be implemented. VP McCrorie stated it is not yet possible to speculate on what improvements, if any, need to be implemented at this time until the investigation / review has been completed.

ADM Zafar stated that the vast majority of applicants are truthful and clarified the elements of eligibility vs. admissibility. Additionally, she spoke to the process of comprehensive security reviews based on risk indicators.

Interim Director Lloyd challenged members' assertion that the security and intelligence community failed in its response, emphasizing that the security and intelligence community responded quickly and effectively to the threat when relevant information was identified.

LPC members asked if it is possible to screen every online video, including those on the dark web. Additionally, questions were asked about collaboration between agencies and the number of cases referred, as well as the process of attaining citizenship and revocation of citizenship. Further inquiries were tabled regarding details of the comprehensive screening process.

Members challenged the CPC's assertion that Canada is underperforming partners in the intelligence space and disagreed that the system is broken. LPC members highlighted that many inadmissible applicants are turned away from the border.

VP McCrorie stated the Agency is coordinating efforts with partners to best identify solutions, including additional searches of the dark web. VP McCrorie also spoke to the comprehensive screening process and information sharing agreements with partners. VP McCrorie emphasized the importance of collaboration between the CBSA and partners.

ADM Zafar stated that every application for asylum to Canada is screened by IRCC. Interim Director Lloyd also spoke to cases where there is a risk indicator and the application of a range of screening tools. Lloyd spoke to the increasing risk of violent extremism, but also highlighted there are a small number of individuals in Canada looking to mobilize to violence.

ADM Gill outlined the process by which citizenship can be revoked, a decision which is ultimately rendered by the Minister of IRCC.

The BQ asked questions of VP McCrorie regarding his statements about the security screening system. The member also spoke to the problem of funding and inquired as to how many individuals are in Canada preparing to conduct terrorist attacks. He questioned if the security and intelligence community possesses adequate resources to prevent violent extremists from coming to Canada. He emphasized a need to improve the security screening process and expressed concern about the presence of additional family members of the accused in Canada.

The member highlighted increased targets for asylum requests and the increased immigration demand and asked if the resource allocation to the screening process ought to be increased. The member also inquired about exemptions which can be used to gain entry into Canada and inquired about the Third Safe Country agreement with the United States.

VP McCrorie acknowledged the member's concern, which has prompted a review of the case. However, he reiterated that thorough security processes are in place and the best decision was rendered based on information available at the time of admission. VP McCrorie reassured the member that the security and intelligence community is conducting a review of existing procedures to identify what measures, if any, can be implemented to improve the security screening process.

Regarding the Third Safe County agreement, ADM Zafar responded by stating that the agreement has some exceptions, such as the family exception, and reiterated that all asylum claimants underdo comprehensive screening.

The NDP asked what we can learn from other countries and what de-radicalization efforts are being pursued by the government. The member highlighted the successful outcome of this case and the effective work being conducted by the security and intelligence community. However, he stressed concern that the terrorist plot was in an advanced stage and the need to conduct a thorough review / investigation. Finally, he inquired about the challenges of gathering intelligence from abroad.

ADM Zafar spoke to the reasons a person may be inadmissible, which includes terrorist related activities. She emphasized there are different inadmissibility requirements in different countries.

Interim Director Lloyd confirmed that conflicts occurring abroad can impact Canada and cross our border, but reassured the member that the national security community has the resources required to address these threats upon detection.

Follow-ups

LPC undertaking directed at IRCC: What is the difference in security screening procedures between overseas and inland applicants seeking asylum? (12:52 pm)

LPC undertaking directed at RCMP: Can you tell us about the GTA Integrated National Security Enforcement Team that made the arrest? (2:13 pm)

Next steps

Additional meetings to be scheduled.

SECU meeting transcript #1 (August 28, 2024)

Refer to SECU August 28, 2024 - meeting 116: Review of the Foiled Terrorist Plot in Toronto and of the Security Screening Process

SECU meeting transcript #2 (August 28, 2024)

Refer to SECU August 28, 2024 - meeting 117: Review of the Foiled Terrorist Plot in Toronto and of the Security Screening Process

SECU overview and committee biographies

Committee Members: At a glance

About the Committee

SECU was created on April 5, 2006, at the start of the 39th Parliament. The Committee is responsible for one of the largest departmental portfolios, including close to 140 statutes administered by the Department of Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness and its agencies, including the CBSA.

Committee Mandate

SECU reviews the legislation, policies, programs and expenditure plans of government departments and agencies responsible for public safety and national security, policing and law enforcement, corrections and conditional release of federal offenders, emergency management, crime prevention and the protection of Canada's borders.

The Standing Orders of the House of Commons provide that the committee may review and report on:

• Legislation proposed by the government or Members of Parliament
• Immediate, medium- and long-term expenditure plans, and the effectiveness of their implementation by the department
• An analysis of the relative success of the relevant department, as measured by the results obtained as compared with its stated objectives
• Other matters relating to the mandate, management, organization, or operation of the department in question, as the Committee deems fit

The committee examines the policies, programs and statutes relating to the following departments and agencies:

• Public Safety Canada (PS)
• Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA)
• Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS)
• Correctional Service Canada (CSC)
• Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP)
• Parole Board of Canada (PBC)
• Civilian Review and Complaints Commission for the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (CRCC)
• Royal Canadian Mounted Police External Review Committee (ERC)
• Office of the Correctional Investigator (OCI)

CBSA-related Committee activity since winter 2023

(January 2023 to present)

• Effects of the withdrawn amendments (G-4 and G-46) to Bill C-21, An Act to amend certain Acts and to make certain consequential amendments (firearms) – completed on Tuesday, April 25, 2023
• Bill C-21, An Act to amend certain Acts and to make certain consequential amendments (firearms) – Completed and Report presented to the House on Friday, May 12, 2023
• Bill C-20, An Act establishing the Public Complaints and Review Commission and amending certain Acts and statutory instrument – Completed and Report presented to the House on Thursday, November 9, 2023

Current studies

• Growing Problem of Car Thefts in Canada Rights of Victims, Reclassification and Transfer of Federal Offenders
• Mandate and Priorities of the Minister of Public Safety
• Bill C-26, An Act respecting cyber security, amending the Telecommunications Act and making consequential amendments to other Acts
• Bill S-210, An Act to restrict young persons' online access to sexually explicit material
• 2022 Saskatchewan Mass Murders

Committee Members

Ron McKinnon (Chair)

Political affiliation: Liberal Party of Canada
Constituency: Coquitlam—Port Coquitlam, British Columbia

Profession/Occupation: Computer Systems Analyst

Political experience:

• First elected in 2015 and re-elected in 2019 and 2021
• Former Chair of the Standing Committee on Health (January 2020 to August 2021)

Doug Shipley (First Vice-Chair)

Political affiliation: Conservative Party of Canada
Constituency: Barrie—Springwater—Oro-Medonte, Ontario

Profession/Occupation: Politician, Small business owner

Political experience:

• First elected in 2019 and re-elected in 2021
• Former Member of SECU (February 2020 to August 2021)

Potential key interests: Barrie opioid crisis

Kristina Michaud (Second Vice-Chair)

Political affiliation: Bloc Québécois
Constituency: Avignon—La Mitis—Matane—Matapédia, Quebec
Critic for Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness, Climate Change, Youth (since 2019)

• Profession/Occupation: Political staffer
• Riding includes Port of Matane (marine, commercial)

Political experience:

• First elected in 2019 and re-elected in 2021
• Long-time member (February 2020 to present) and Vice Chair of SECU (October 2020 to present)

Jennifer O'Connell

Political affiliation: Liberal Party of Canada
Constituency: Pickering-Uxbridge, Ontario
Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Public Safety, Democratic Institutions and Intergovernmental Affairs (Cybersecurity) (since September 2023)

Profession/Occupation: Politician

Political experience:

• First elected in 2015 and re-elected in 2019 and 2021
• Former Parliamentary Secretary to the:
  • Minister of Intergovernmental Affairs, Infrastructure and Communities (December 2021 to September 2023)
  • Minister of Health (2021)
  • Minister of Finance (March 2018 to September 2019)

Heath Macdonald

Political affiliation: Liberal Party of Canada
Constituency: Malpeque, Prince Edward Island

Profession/Occupation: Politician/ Director

Political experience:

• First Elected in 2021
• Current member of Standing Committee on Agriculture and Agri-Food (AGRI) and Subcommittee on Agenda and Procedure of the Standing Committee on Agriculture and Agri-Food (SAGRI)
• Long-time MLA in PEI. Earned recognition from various organizations for his efforts to improve accessibility for people with disabilities

Chris Bittle

Political affiliation: Liberal Party of Canada
Constituency: St. Catharines, Ontario
Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister of Housing, Infrastructure and Communities (since September 2023)

Profession/Occupation: Politician

Political experience:

• First elected in 2015 and re-elected in 2019 and 2021
• Former Parliamentary Secretary to the:
  • Minister of Canadian Heritage (December 2021 to September 2023)
  • Minister of Environment and Climate Change (March to August 2021)
  • Minister of Transport (December 2019 to March 2021)

Iqwinder Gaheer

Political affiliation: Liberal Party of Canada
Constituency: Mississauga—Malton

Profession/Occupation: Politician and Lawyer

Political experience:

• First elected in 2001
• Member of SECU and INDU

Salma Zahid

Political affiliation: Liberal Party of Canada
Constituency: Scarborough Centre, Ontario

Profession/Occupation: Community organizer working to support women, their families and youth, and served the public in several positions with the Government of Ontario

Political experience:

• First elected in 2015 and re-elected in 2019 and 2021
• Former Chair of the Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration, and was a member of the Special Committee on Afghanistan
• Also a committee member of:
  • the Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration
  • Subcommittee on Agenda and Procedure of the Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration

Alistair MacGregor

Political affiliation: New Democratic Party of Canada
Constituency: Cowichan—Malahat—Langford
NDP Critic for Public Safety

Profession/Occupation: Worked as a tree-planting supervisor and a millworker

Political experience:

• First Elected in 2015 and re-elected in 2019 and 2021
• Also a committee member of:
  • Standing Committee on Agriculture and Agri-Food
• Previously the NDP Critic for:
  • Agriculture and Agri-Food
  • Food Price Inflation
  • Deputy Critic for Justice
  • Seniors' Issues, Justice Vice-Chair of the Special Joint Committee on Medical Assistance in Dying

Dane Lloyd

Political affiliation: Conservative Party of Canada
Constituency: Sturgeon River—Parkland, Alberta
Shadow Minister for Emergency Preparedness (since November 2021)

• Profession/Occupation: Politician
• Riding includes Villeneuve Airport (airport of entry)
  "service suspended until further notice"

Political experience:

• First elected in 2017 and re-elected in 2019 and 2021
• Former Shadow Minister for:
  • Digital Government (September 2020 to February 2021)
  • Rural Economic Development (February 2021 to November 2021)

Glen Motz

Political affiliation: Conservative Party of Canada
Constituency: Medicine Hat—Cardston—Warner

Occupation: Served for 35 years with the Medicine Hat Police Service and retired as Inspector in 2015

Political experience:

• First elected in 2016
• Vice Chair DEDC and Member of SECU
• Previously served on the National Security and Intelligence Committee of Parliamentarians (NSICOP)

Raquel Dancho

Political affiliation: Conservative Party of Canada
Constituency: Kildonan – St. Paul

Occupation: Policy Analyst; Political Assistant

Political experience:

• First elected in 2019
• Member of SECU and Shadow Minister for Public Safety