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Issue notes—Special Committee on Canada-China Relations: National Security Dimension of the Canada-China Relationship (March 11, 2021)

Import prohibition on goods produced by forced labour

Proposed response

As a result of the Canada-United States-Mexico Agreement (CUSMA), Canada is establishing a new regime to prohibit the importation of goods produced from forced labour, to be led by Employment and Social Development Canada (ESDC) and implemented in partnership with CBSA, Global Affairs Canada (GAC) and other departments.

This includes prohibiting the importation of goods that are mined, manufactured, or produced wholly or in part by forced labour, where there is sufficient evidence to do so.

Since the prohibition came into effect on , the CBSA has been working closely with ESDC and others on its implementation – issuing a customs notice immediately and working closely with international allies to leverage intelligence and information, including on best practices.

The Agency also recently concluded a legal framework with ESDC to ensure access to actionable information on suspected importation of goods from forced labour, which is needed to interdict such products.

The CBSA is ready to respond at the border, if and as required.

If pressed on implementation of CUSMA commitments

On , the CBSA issued a Customs Notice giving effect to this prohibition and advising importers of the requirements to comply.

The Agency also set out immediately to establish protocols with ESDC, to clearly outline roles, responsibilities, legal authorities, and procedures for the exchange of information necessary to implement and enforce this requirement.

A Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) was signed with ESDC on of this year, which now positions us to act upon information that may be forthcoming from ESDC. This information is critical to underpin enforcement actions.

In addition, we have been working with Global Affairs Canada since this prohibition came into effect to support their efforts to ensure that Canadian importers were made aware of their obligations in this regard.

The CBSA will also leverage intelligence and indicators on this practice from our B5 partners. In particular, the Agency has been working with its Customs and Border Protection (CBP) counterparts in the United States to learn about their program and to explore setting up information exchange protocols to coordinate approaches to eradicating the global scourge of forced labour.

If pressed on why it is taking so long

Establishing the legal framework for the program and developing indicators was required to launch the program. Unlike most other inadmissible products, there is no visual clue for a Border Services Officer to understand the labour standards by which a particular import was produced.

ESDC's work to generate a report to the CBSA requires research, coordination, and diligence with importers, exporters, and suppliers to establish reliable and actionable sources of information to stamp out this practice.

Background

Article 23.6 of the Canada-United States-Mexico Agreement (CUSMA) obligated the Parties to prohibit the importation of goods manufactured or produced wholly or in part by forced labour. The provision also committed the Parties to cooperate with regard to the identification and movement of goods produced by forced labour. Prior to CUSMA, Canada did not have a legislated prohibition on importing goods produced by forced labour.

On , the CBSA issued a customs notice to advise stakeholders of the new prohibition. This completed implementation of the legal requirements of the CUSMA obligation.

On , the Department of Finance amended the Customs Tariff as part of the legislation implementing CUSMA in Canada to include a prohibition on importing goods produced by forced labour. The Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) is responsible for enforcement of the Customs Tariff.

The Customs Tariff import prohibition is the only legislative enforcement tool in Canadian law regarding the importation of goods produced by forced labour. In addition, the Customs Tariff can not be used to prohibit the importation of goods solely on the basis of originating from a specific country or region. Implementing such restrictions would fall under the purview of Global Affairs Canada.

Employment and Social Development Canada (ESDC) is the Government of Canada's lead department for labour-related programs, including the implementation and administration of the forced labour CUSMA obligations in Canada.

Since , the CBSA worked closely with ESDC to develop a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) that establishes the enforcement regime for forced labour import prohibition. The MOU between CBSA and EDSC was signed and came into effect on .

Under the MOU, ESDC is responsible for researching and analyzing allegations of companies importing goods produced by forced labour to Canada. ESDC will provide reports to the CBSA identifying the companies, commodities, and the evidence regarding suspected importations of goods produced by forced labour. Their analysis includes reviewing allegations or complaints, researching relevant data, seeking further information from the importer, exporter and affected parties (such as suppliers).The CBSA may use this information to identify and intercept shipments containing these goods.

Shipments containing goods suspected of being produced by forced labour are detained at the border for inspection by a border services officer. If in the judgement of the officer, the goods were produced by forced labour, the officer will apply the appropriate tariff classification and prohibit the goods from entering Canada. Tariff classification determinations are made on a case-by-case basis for each specific import, based on available supporting evidence and analysis.

Since the MOU came into effect, the CBSA has yet to receive actionable information with which to apply the Customs Tariff import prohibition for goods produced by forced labour.

Since the introduction of the forced labour provisions in CUSMA, ESDC and the CBSA have been engaging with the United States Customs and Border Protection (CBP) on several occasions to discuss information sharing and best identification practices. Discussions towards formalizing such an exchange of information are ongoing.

The Border Five (B5) partners have also discussed the issue of forced labour from various angles, including the intelligence requirements to address the trade aspects of forced labour. This includes identifying information sources that would assist in identifying the use of forced labour in supply chains and supporting enforcement actions. CBSA will collaborate with B5 towards the active use of these new authorities.

Importers are encouraged to work with their foreign suppliers to ensure that any goods imported into Canada have not been mined, manufactured or produced wholly or in part by forced or compulsory labour.

The Government of Canada expects companies to take every step possible to ensure that their supply chains conform to Canadian law with respect to the prohibition on the import of forced labour. It is the responsibility of the importing company to conduct due diligence on its supply chains to ensure that it is not directly or indirectly sourcing products from entities implicated in forced labour or other human rights violations.

Follow-up from appearance: Agricultural goods produced by forced labour

Question #2

Ms. Lenore Zann: Thank you, and can you hear me, Chair? Okay, thank you. I was having a little bit of trouble with the stability of my service here. [Technical difficulty]…because earlier this year, Canada did join our international partners in cracking down on companies doing business with certain firms based in China's Xinjiang province and region following the credible reports of human rights violations affective Uighurs and other ethnic minorities in the region. I'd like to hear a little bit more about how our Canadian Border Security Agency and others work to prohibit such goods from entering our borders and how do you know which goods and parts of goods are made in such a fashion?

Mr. John Ossowski: Thank you for the question. As I mentioned earlier, Employment and Social Development Canada is the lead government department for labour-related programs. We work closely with ESDC to identify goods that have been produced by forced labour and prevent their entry into Canada. Generally speaking, all goods entering Canada, including shipments from China, may be subject to more in-depth secondary examination. We use a risk management approach to determine which goods entering Canada require a deeper examination. As the minister said, anything that's mined, manufactured, produced wholly or in part by force labour […] is prohibited from entering Canada, so obviously we would look into anything where we have evidence to do so to prevent its entry.

Ms. Lenore Zann: Thank you. What about agricultural goods? I had heard something about cotton, for instance. Are you aware of any of those kinds of goods?

Mr. John Ossowski: I'm not aware of that specifically. As I said, the program just started as of the signing of the new trade agreement last summer. I'd have to get back to you on that. If there's something specific on cotton, I'll send you a report.

Response

The CBSA is aware of forced labour concerns with respect to cotton and tomatoes from Xinjiang, China. The United States recently implemented control measures on these goods under their legislative regime for goods produced by forced labour.

In Canada, Employment and Social Development's (ESDC) Labour Program is actively monitoring and researching evidence related to supply chains, including those related to agricultural goods, like cotton produced in Xinjiang, China. Once ESDC's research and analysis is complete, they share any documented evidence of goods being produced by forced labour with the CBSA. The Agency may use this information to identify and intercept shipments containing goods that are suspected to have been produced by forced labour.

Upon interception, and when it has sufficient evidence to do so, the CBSA will prohibit such goods from entering Canada by classifying them under item no. 9897.00.00 of the Customs Tariff. Those determinations are made on commercial shipments on a case-by-case basis, based on available supporting evidence and analysis.

To date, the CBSA has not applied the tariff prohibition against goods produced by forced labour.

Border security contracts (Nuctech)

Proposed response

The safety and security of Canada is a top priority for the CBSA.

The CBSA has fulfilled its contractual obligations with Nuctech.

We can confirm that these devices are not connected to the CBSA networks as they are stand-alone systems and isolated from Government of Canada networks.

Any new procurements will be conducted under new contract security guidelines which will ensure that detection equipment at the port of entry are subject to higher security considerations.

Decisions to award contracts undergo a thorough review and are made in accordance with established Government of Canada guidelines.

If pressed

Public Service and Procurement Canada (PSPC) is the contracting authority for the Government of Canada.

The CBSA works closely with PSPC on large contracts and relies on their expertise to address any security risks related to those contracting activities. These security assessments are undertaken by PSPC's Industrial Security Program.

A standard security Requirements Checklist is completed for contracts, outlining any specific security requirements.

Supplier's staff, who undertake the installation or maintenance activities required in the contracts, are security-cleared by the Agency prior to being allowed access to CBSA facilities and they are escorted.

If pressed on the supply chain integrity assessment by Communications Security Establishment (CSE)

While this equipment is not connected to any internal networking systems, to ensure the integrity of the equipment, the CBSA did request an assessment by CSE be completed when it became aware of possible concerns.

The assessment was only one aspect of CBSA's overall review, which helped to inform CBSA of any associated risks and apply appropriate mitigations with regards to the supply chain integrity.

Background

On , Global News published an article, noting that Nuctech had been awarded four border security and customs warehouse contracts to provide scanners and lab equipment to the CBSA. On , Global News published another article, referencing the same four contracts.

The CBSA currently has four fulfilled procurement contracts for the acquisition of detection technology with Nuctech - the earliest of which commenced in the fall of 2017, and the latest fulfilled in fall of 2020. Five Pallet Large Scale Imaging (LSI) systems were also scheduled to be purchased under the Initiative to Take Action Against Gun and Gang Violence (ITAAGGV), and installed at major air cargo centers across the country.

The latest contract for the Mobile LSI was fulfilled in . After conducting performance and usability tests, the unit was planned to be deployed to a land border. If successful, this product was to replace the current fleet of aging Mobile LSIs; however, the CBSA has not deployed this equipment.

All of these devices are standalone devices, not directly connected to the CBSA or Government of Canada (GoC) networks. Images and information are stored directly on the devices themselves, with an over-writing function once the hard-drive fills up. It is suggested that this is about every 30 days. The devices had previously been serviced between one to two times per year (which would include any maintenance and updates) by an employee/engineer from the Nuctech, who requires escort while on CBSA premises. Each contract would have a two year warranty covering preventative maintenance (1 to 2 times per year) as well as servicing for any issues. After this, there would be options within the contract to extend the maintenance/servicing.

The typical lifecycle for these devices is approximately eight years; however, given the sensitive role that detection technology plays at the border and for the security of Canada, as well as PSPC's recent classification of detection technology at the border as a sensitive sector, the CBSA is currently reviewing all of its detection technology and future procurements.

The CBSA works with PSPC's specialist Industrial Security Program to address any security risks related to the contracting activities. The work involved in clearing Nuctech Co. Ltd, as well as any particular supplier, is done by PSPC's Industrial Security Program. The CBSA, as a client of PSPC, provides the requirements for the contract, as it would for any other contract, in the Statement of Work. Once the vendor has been cleared and the contract is awarded by PSPC, the CBSA is responsible for security screening of any contractors who require unrestricted access to CBSA's premises or information.

The details of the CBSA's four fulfilled contracts with Nuctech are as follows:

  1. Contract A (value $2.54 million CAD) commenced on , for the purchase of a Pallet / Large Scale Imaging System – this has been installed and is used to X-ray palletized goods
  2. Contract B (value $1.01 million CAD) commenced on , for the purchase of [Redacted] Warehouse X-Ray Systems – these have been installed in a number of facilities across Canada and are used to X-ray commercial goods
  3. Contract C (value $0.48 million CAD) commenced on , for the purchase of [Redacted] Low Conveyor X-Ray Systems – these have been installed in a number of facilities across Canada and are used to X-ray passenger baggage in secondary operations
  4. Contract D (value $4.00 million CAD) commenced on , for the purchase of a Mobile Large Scale Imaging System

Key messages

Additional speaking points

As soon as the CBSA became aware of the concerns surrounding Nuctech imaging equipment, on , it began a review of its own contracts, procurement, and imaging equipment.

Only a small portion of our overall CBSA suite of detection technology is Nuctech manufactured equipment.

Our review did not identify any security breaches or incidents of concern with our x-ray detection equipment.

We have also implemented a number of risk mitigation measures in this space.

I can also confirm that the Nuctech equipment does not handle classified, sensitive or personalized material, and is not directly connected to CBSA or Government of Canada networks. These are stand-alone devices, used for a very specific purpose at various Ports of Entry.

We have not identified any risk to Canada or Canadians through the deployment of this equipment.

Anytime non-CBSA personnel are required to come to a CBSA Port of Entry or facility for delivery, installation or maintenance of equipment, they are screened, escorted and monitored to ensure the integrity of our facilities and programs, and the safety and security of our operations.

The four procurement processes that resulted in contracts with Nuctech were conducted in accordance with Government of Canada guidelines.

All were open competitive processes wherein the vendor objectively scored the highest with respect to technical merit (as per the requirements set out in the Request for Proposal (RFP)) and price.

As the equipment procured would not be handling sensitive or personalized material or information, and/or be directly connected to any CBSA or Government of Canada networks, the RFPs were not limited to Canadian firms.

All RFPs were carried out in accordance with Canada's commitments under its trade agreements.

We take the role of detection equipment at the border, and the role it plays in national security and public safety, very seriously. That is why we have been working with our security, intelligence, procurement and public safety partners to review our processes for procurement of all detection equipment to be used at the border. We will be applying even more scrutiny in future procurement.

I want to assure you that the CBSA has taken steps to identify and mitigate any risks posed by these and other procurement processes.

We have robust intelligence and departmental security programs. We are working closely with our partners in the Government of Canada Security and Intelligence Community, and will continuously monitor and review our own processes and activities in all aspects of our operations.

Wanzhou Meng case

Proposed response

I cannot speak to the specifics of this case as it is currently before the courts. The extradition proceedings are currently before the Supreme Court of British Colombia.

All persons, including Canadian citizens, seeking entry to Canada must present to the CBSA and may be subject to a more in-depth exam. The CBSA has policies and procedures that it follows for all secondary examinations to determine the admissibility of people and goods into Canada.

Background

Ms. Meng arrived off a Cathay flight from Hong Kong on . She was met by Canada Border Services Agency (CBSA) officers who had been notified of a provisional arrest warrant for her extradition to the United States for fraud (over $5,000), issued on by the Supreme Court of British Columbia. The CBSA advised Ms. Meng that her customs examination was concluded and she was released to the care and control of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) who then arrested her for the purposes of extradition. On , the CBSA issued a warrant for the continuation of her examination and determination of admissibility to Canada under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (IRPA). At no point during this process was Ms. Meng detained by the CBSA. The CBSA followed its policies and procedures for secondary examination to determine the admissibility of people and goods into Canada.

Ms. Meng's bail hearing under the extradition process concluded on and she was ordered released on various conditions, including a $10 million bond. At the time of her release, the CBSA executed its warrant, releasing her on conditions and deferring her examination until enough evidence is gathered to make an admissibility determination under IRPA.

On , the Minister of Justice issued an Authority to Proceed in Ms. Meng's extradition matter, formally commencing her extradition process. The same day, Ms. Meng filed a civil action against the CBSA, the RCMP and their officers seeking an unspecified amount of damages for breaching her section 7, 8, 9, 10(a) and 10(b) Charter rights and unlawfully detaining her at the Vancouver International Airport. She is alleging that RCMP officers and/or representatives of the United States Department of Justice arranged for the CBSA to delay the immediate execution of the arrest warrant in order to obtain evidence and information from Ms. Meng, including the examination of her baggage and electronic devices, under the guise of a routine border check.

On , the CBSA filed its Statement of Defense.

The Government of Canada disclosure of relevant documents in the civil action was made on .

In her separate extradition proceedings United States v. Meng, a disclosure motion filed by Ms. Meng was argued before the Supreme Court of British Colombia between and . This motion was brought in order to seek further disclosure of documents (more than would normally be permitted in such a matter) from the Government of Canada.

The motion was made in furtherance of an abuse of process motion brought by Ms. Meng's counsel. On , the court ruled that Ms. Meng had met the legal test for disclosure and made an Order for further document production.

The Government of Canada disclosed the relevant documents in the extradition proceedings in . The Government of Canada filed motions under s.37 and s.38 of the Canada Evidence Act to protect sensitive information, which the court upheld on and .

As part of the abuse of process allegations in the extradition proceedings, CBSA and RCMP officers testified for approximately four weeks from October to . The four weeks were spread out during three months due to the scheduling availability of the court and the testimony taking longer than anticipated.

On , Ms. Meng applied to the court to amend her bail conditions, which the court denied on .

Ms. Meng has filed her submissions relating to the abuse of process allegations in the extradition proceedings on . The Government of Canada's are due on and the hearing is set to take place from until .

Additional Information

From October to , hearings took place on the 2nd branch of the abuse of process allegations, which include allegations that the CBSA and RCMP were conspiring to obtain information for U.S. authorities. Over the course of these hearings, 4 CBSA officers testified, as well as 1 CBSA chief and a former CBSA Regional Director General.

Aide Memoires were to be provided to briefly summarize the positions of the parties related to the 2nd branch of abuse allegations. The Aide Memoires reference supporting evidence and serve as a guideline of what the parties will argue in their submissions. Ms. Meng's counsels filed their Aide Memoire on and the Department of Justice (DOJ) filed the Attorney General of Canada's (AGC) Aide Memoire on . It is unknown whether the Court will release the Aide Memoires to the press.

On Ms. Meng's lawyers filed their final submissions on the 2nd branch of the abuse of process allegations. On DOJ filed the AGC's final submissions on the same allegations.

It is anticipated that the Court may allow the release of the final submissions to the press during the week of . The Court must order the release and has not yet notified the AGC or Ms. Meng as to when this will occur.

Extradition hearing timelines

The next hearing date is Monday, . When the court hearing resumes, arguments will be heard related to the second branch of the abuse of process allegations and one other issue that does not relate to the CBSA. This hearing is expected to go on until , though there are further dates available if needed.

The AGC is set to file its committal submissions (these relate to whether Ms. Meng has committed an extraditable offence) on and Ms. Meng's committal submissions are due .

The Court is set to hear arguments on the 3rd branch of abuse of process, requested remedies and committal from to .

These dates are subject to change depending on what occurs in further hearings.

Next steps for the CBSA

Her extradition matter will have to be concluded prior to the CBSA continuing any investigation into her admissibility.

In light of the extradition proceedings, the CBSA will postpone any reviews or actions pertaining to her immigration status.

Opioids / Illicit narcotics

Proposed response

Protecting Canadians from the harms associated with illegal substances, especially in the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic, continues to be a priority for the Government of Canada.

Since , the opioid overdose crisis has claimed the lives of more than 17,600 Canadians and continues to represent a significant and ongoing public health emergency.

The impact of the COVID-19 pandemic has worsened the opioid crisis, leading to a reported increase in opioid-related deaths and substance use harms in 2020.

Canada's response to the opioid crisis, and problematic substance use in general, balances public health and safety considerations, and emphasizes the importance of demand and supply reduction measures as encompassed in the Canadian Drugs and Substances Strategy.

Public Safety Canada, together with its portfolio partners, is actively working to support law enforcement in reducing the supply of illegal substances, including synthetic opioids like fentanyl, which are a key driver of this crisis.

We know that many of these substances, and increasingly, the chemicals used to manufacture them, come from China and surrounding areas and that demand for them remains high.

As such, cooperation with Chinese authorities is important to effectively disrupt the importation of, and trafficking in, these substances.

As a result of international pressure, in , China implemented more stringent controls on fentanyl and its analogues.

Public Safety Canada continues to monitor emerging trends in the illicit drug market and engage with its portfolio and international partners to advance supply reduction policies to mitigate the harms posed by these substances.

If pressed on what the Canada Border Services Agency is doing to stop these substances from entering Canada

CBSA is aware of the threat that fentanyl, its analogues and precursors pose and uses a variety of detection tools, techniques, and the latest scientific technology to interdict illicit drugs at the border.

In recent years, the Government of Canada has invested in increased capacity at the CBSA to interdict illicit substances, including the training and deployment of six additional detector dog teams and equipping ports of entry for the safe examination of highly toxic substances.

With China's stricter controls on fentanyl and fentanyl analogues, synthetic alternatives and non-scheduled precursor chemicals are now being imported to meet expanding Canadian demand.

In collaboration with its government partners, the CBSA continues to ensure that adequate controls are in place to combat the smuggling of toxic substances and decrease the risk of harmful opioids going undetected and entering Canada.

If pressed on recent Canada Border Services Agency seizures of fentanyl

Between and , the CBSA has performed 2,246 opioid seizures from global sources, totaling over 2,829 kilograms.

In 2020, seizures included:

  • 5.8 kilograms of fentanyl, an increase of 1,662% compared to 2019 and representing a potential 2.9 million lethal doses
  • 1,158 kilograms of cocaine (an 18% decrease compared to 2019)
  • 788 kilograms of methamphetamine (a 46% increase compared to 2019)
  • 659 kilograms of opium (a 109% increase compared to 2019)
  • 92 kilograms of heroin (no change compared to 2019)

These results can be directly attributed to improved targeting, intelligence, and deployment of additional enforcement resources.

If pressed on RCMP-China collaboration on investigations related to fentanyl

China remains a source country for fentanyl, fentanyl analogues, and increasingly, precursor chemicals flowing to Canada.

The RCMP has been working with Chinese authorities to investigate and disrupt the illegal export of fentanyl, fentanyl analogues, and precursor chemicals to Canada.

Through these efforts, China has become a key partner in combatting fentanyl trafficking and Canada appreciates China's domestic efforts to improve its fentanyl scheduling regime.

[Redacted]

Background

With more than 17,600 opioid-related deaths since , the opioid overdose crisis is a national public health and safety epidemic of significant concern to the Government of Canada. The COVID-19 pandemic has exacerbated the opioid crisis. Fentanyl and fentanyl analogues are responsible for a significant portion of opioid toxicity deaths.

Supply trends

Fentanyl seizures by Canadian law enforcement have been increasing since 2011. Since 2016, China has been a significant exporter of fentanyl and fentanyl analogues to Canada. Today, fentanyl powders continue to be ordered on the Internet and smuggled into Canada [Redacted] however, precursor and pre-precursor chemical imports [Redacted] are displacing the ready-made fentanyl threat and contributing to domestic production of fentanyl.

China has been responsive to international requests to schedule fentanyl and related substances. In , China scheduled fentanyl and its analogues as controlled substances. Since China implemented these controls, CBSA has recorded only one fentanyl seizure from China. In 2020, CBSA made fewer seizures of fentanyl from global sources (down by 42% with 13 seizures in 2020), but seized larger quantities of fentanyl (up by 1,662%) relative to 2019. Import of precursor chemicals has been increasing since 2018.

[Redacted]

Ultimately, the emergence of new countries as source and transit points for fentanyl and various analogues could signal the beginning of a diversification of routings as traffickers attempt to evade law enforcement efforts aimed at China. [Redacted]

Federal action

To further assist health, law enforcement and border officials in addressing the opioid overdose crisis, the Government of Canada has amended several Acts to, for example, restrict the importation of pill presses and other devices used to produce pills containing illegal opioids and to allow border officers greater authority to interdict controlled substances in international mail.

The Public Safety Portfolio continues to monitor emerging trends in the illicit drug market and is engaging with its domestic and international partners to advance supply reduction efforts. To this end, the RCMP has a Memorandum of Understanding with the Chinese Ministry of Public Security that facilitates joint work on, inter alia, illicit drug trafficking. [Redacted]

Other federal actions include the creation of the Organized Crime Joint Operations Centre (OC JOC) between RCMP, CBSA [Redacted] to coordinate operational responses to address the illicit drug problem; the National Chemical Precursor Diversion Program to prevent the flow of precursors from legitimate industry to drug traffickers; and, the RCMP's Clandestine Laboratory Enforcement and Response team to assist other police services to combat drug threats.

Follow-up from appearance: CBSA efforts to interdict illicit opioids

Question #1

Mr. Jack Harris: Minister, you raised another question about fentanyl and obviously Canadians are very concerned about the huge number of opioid overdose deaths in this country, particularly in the last year. Seventy-five percent of opioid deaths are attributed to fentanyl. In 2012, a previous government laid off over a thousand Canadian border service agents in some money-saving thing called DRAP (Deficit Reduction Action Plan). They haven't been replaced and yet you say that there's been 335 seizures of fentanyl, 42 kilograms of it, but we're still having these huge numbers of deaths associated with fentanyl. Do you really have enough border security and ability to interdict this incoming fentanyl that's causing all these deaths?

Hon. Bill Blair: There are a couple of things in response, Mr. Harris. We know that many of the drugs and the precursor chemicals used in their manufacturing are imported into this country and that the source of those is often Southeast Asia and quite often China. I've already indicated that. We are doing a great deal of work. I have the president of CBSA also online and can talk about the work that we've been doing over the past five years to restore those staffing and budget cuts that were imposed by the previous government under the deficit reduction action plan that they put in place.

If we perhaps get more time or another time, I can also talk to you about the excellent work that's going on, including our conversations just this week with the United States about re-establishing the cross-border crime forum which enables strong collaboration for Canada and its closest ally and partner, the United States, in dealing with these issues, particularly the importation of opioid drugs.

Mr. Jack Harris: It's been suggested that perhaps a hundred and fifty or sixty border guards have been added instead of the thousand that had been lost.

Hon. Bill Blair: I would, if the chair allows us time, invite the president of CBSA to talk about some of the excellent work that he's been doing to respond to that work. I'm getting the time out. I apologize for that. Mr. Harris, I'll happily follow up with you with the CBSA president because the question's a good one.

Response

The CBSA is responsible for providing integrated border services that support national security and public safety priorities and facilitate legitimate cross-border traffic.

In collaboration with government partners, the CBSA ensures that adequate controls are in place to combat the smuggling of toxic substances and decrease the risk of harmful opioids going undetected and entering Canada. The Agency employs a wide range of technology and tools to support the detection of illicit opioids and their precursors, and trained Border Services Officers screen both travellers and goods at ports of entry, as well as commercial goods coming into Canada by air, land, and rail.

CBSA intelligence staff work to track threats and risks, and Enforcement Officers and Investigators undertake specific investigations and work with police partners to pursue criminal consequences for those engaged in illicit activity.

Between and , the Agency performed 2,246 opioid seizures from global sources, totalling over 2,829 kilograms. In 2020, seizures included 5.8 kilograms of fentanyl, an increase of 1,662% compared to 2019, and representing 2.9 million potential lethal doses.

These results can be directly attributed to improved targeting, intelligence, and deployment of additional enforcement resources.

In recent years, the Government of Canada has invested in increasing the CBSA's capacity to interdict illicit substances, including the training and deployment of six additional detector dog teams.

Targeted investments have also been made to enable:

  • Further deployment of trace detection equipment. In addition to evaluating new detection technology, the CBSA Laboratory has increased the effectiveness of efforts to keep up with ever-changing analogues and new substances by updating programming with new chemical signatures. This allows for rapid detection of emerging substances that pose a risk to Canadians and to frontline officers
  • The provision of information on new drug derivatives seized from the CBSA to Health Canada, so that they may update the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act accordingly
  • Postal modernization, which will enhance the Agency's ability to use advance package data to improve targeting and interdiction efforts
  • The implementation of Designated Safe Sampling Areas. The CBSA is in the process of equipping three regional screening facilities, at high risk/high volume locations, to allow for rapid on-site analysis of unknown substances. These three sites will be staffed with chemists and equipped with specialized technology to detect and identify chemicals

Removals: Cases with criminality

Proposed response

The CBSA places the highest priority on removal cases involving national security, organized crime, crimes against humanity and criminals.

If a foreign national or a permanent resident commits a crime in Canada, they must complete their sentence through Canada's judicial system before a removal can take place.

Once individuals have exhausted all legal avenues of appeal and/or due process, they are expected to respect our laws and leave Canada, or be removed by the CBSA.

Should a foreign national be deemed inadmissible and is considered to be a danger to the public, they may be detained in immigration detention until their removal is conducted.

It's important to note that detention is an essential tool to support the removal of inadmissible persons from Canada. The primary objective of detention is to protect the health and safety of Canadians and to maintain the security of Canadian society.

Furthermore, individuals that pose a danger to the public or are considered a flight risk may be escorted to their final destination.

Serious inadmissibility cases represent 2% of the overall removal working inventory with 35 cases out of 1,866. Of these, three (3) cases have no impediments to removal and are being scheduled for removal.

Background

One of the Canada Border Services Agency's (CBSA) key mandated objectives is to protect the health and safety of Canadians and to maintain the security of Canadian society. These objectives are found in both the CBSA Act and the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act.

The CBSA places the highest priority on cases involving national security, organized crime, crimes against humanity and criminals. Individuals believed to be inadmissible to Canada for safety and security reasons will have an inadmissibility report written against them. Depending on the particular inadmissibility, a decision as to whether or not to issue a removal order will be made by a reviewing officer acting under the delegated authority of the Minister, or by the Immigration and Refugee Board (IRB). If there is sufficient evidence to support the inadmissibility allegation, a deportation order will be issued against the person concerned.

Not all inadmissibility reports result in a removal order. If the reviewing officer or the IRB determines that the evidence presented is not sufficient to support the allegation, a deportation order will not be issued. To ensure consistency in reporting on safety and security cases, the Agency reports on cases that have completed the entire process and are found inadmissible on safety and security grounds.

It is important to note that the Agency closely monitors the progress of any cases flagged as having evidence on file that could potentially lead to a serious inadmissibility. If a removal order is issued, the agency will monitor the progress until all legal avenues of appeal and due process are exhausted, and commence removal preparations as quickly as possible. If a Foreign National is considered a danger to the public, they may be detained in immigration detention during the removal process.

Individuals subject to a deportation order for a serious inadmissibility may be eligible to a pre-removal risk assessment (PRRA) prior to removal. For those who are serving a term of imprisonment, the CBSA will initiate PRRA while the individual is serving their term of imprisonment to ensure that all due processes are completed before the term is completed. The removal may occur unescorted or under escort if it is required by the airline, the transit country or if the person poses a danger to the public or is a significant flight risk. Once removed, the deportation order bans the individual from Canada for life, unless they receive written permission to return to Canada.

Overall removals
Fiscal years Priority 1:
Serious inadmissibility
Priority 1:
Irregular migrant
Failed refugee claimant
Priority 2:
Refugee claimants
Priority 3:
Other inadmissibilities
Total
2014 to 2015 1,200 not applicable 6,704 4,029 11,933
2015 to 2016 969 not applicable 4,106 3,617 8,692
2016 to 2017 879 not applicable 4,182 2,937 7,998
2017 to 2018 903 139 4,033 3,137 8,212
2018 to 2019 931 436 4,633 3,698 9,698
2019 to 2020 1,026 548 6,318 3,644 11,536
2020 to 2021
(Up to )
391 174 8,561 822 9,948
Total 6,299 1,297 38,537 21,884 68,017

Serious inadmissibility cases represent 6% of the overall removal working inventory with 1,108 cases out of 18,818. Of these, 73 cases have no impediments to removal and are being scheduled for removal.

Chinese nationals removed to China
Fiscal years Priority 1:
Serious inadmissibility
Priority 1:
Irregular migrant
Failed refugee claimant
Priority 2:
Refugee claimants
Priority 3:
Other inadmissibilities
Total
2014 to 2015 30 not applicable 244 198 472
2015 to 2016 29 not applicable 213 255 497
2016 to 2017 21 not applicable 179 206 406
2017 to 2018 36 not applicable 136 173 345
2018 to 2019 23 5 159 243 430
2019 to 2020 24 8 206 194 432
2020 to 2021
(Up to )
6 not applicable 117 42 165
Total 169 13 1,254 1,311 2,747

Serious inadmissibility cases represent 2% of the overall removal working inventory with 35 cases out of 1,866. Of these, 3 cases have no impediments to removal and are being scheduled for their removal.

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